Blood Niobium - Header
Public Document — Independent Investigation
BLOOD NIOBIUM
Protocol: GV-2026-001
bloodniobium.org
Urgent
GUIDE TO VIOLATIONS BLOOD NIOBIUM 2026
GUIDE TO VIOLATIONS
GLÓRIA DUARTE HAS NO WAY TO
ALERT THE WORLD.
But You Do — And The World Needs To Know.
Document Identification
Guide to Accounting/Capital Markets Violations and Humanitarian Violations Identified in the Niobium Extraction at the Boa Vista Mine — Catalão, Goiás, Brazil
For the groups that have the power to act where she cannot reach.
For shareholders/investigators, auditors, regulators, certifiers, niobium buyers, governments, NGOs, the press, and anyone with access to information that Glória Duarte does not have, or mechanisms to reach CMOC that she does not possess.
Presentation Note
FOR PUBLIC USE 2026

This guide was prepared on the basis of public documents, financial statements disclosed by CMOC Group Limited itself (HKEX: 3993), judicial records and prevailing international standards. It does not intend to replace specialized legal analysis. Its objective is to organize information so that shareholders/investigators, auditors, regulators, certifiers, niobium buyers, governments, press and human rights organizations know which questions to ask, where to look for answers, and which standards may have been breached. All independent factual verification is encouraged.

Independent Investigation
PART I — CONTEXTUALIZATION
The Company, The Victim, The ESG Shield, and The Audience

■ THE CASE

On one side: The Company
CMOC Brasil belongs to CMOC Group Limited, a Chinese company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange under code 03993. In 2025, it reported global revenue of RMB 206.7 billion and consolidated profit of RMB 20.3 billion (USD 2.94 billion), with year-on-year growth of 50.3% and a clean opinion from Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. In Brazil, it operates the Boa Vista Mine, in Catalão-Ouvidor (Goiás) — an asset located in a country that holds approximately 98% of the world's reserves and around 90% of global niobium production.
In ten consecutive years under CMOC control (2016–Q1 2026), the Boa Vista Mine produced 86,548 tonnes of niobium (FeNb) — of which 83,878 t were audited by Deloitte in the 2016–2025 period and an additional 2,670 t in Q1 2026. The current pace is approximately 29.67 tonnes per day, equivalent to about USD 1.59 million per day in production value. Estimated accumulated revenue for the period is approximately USD 3.5 billion. In 2025, audited niobium revenue was USD 503.7 million.
The extracted niobium is sold exclusively to IXM S.A. (Geneva) — a wholly-owned subsidiary of CMOC. Deloitte's opinions on CMOC Group's financial statements were clean in all ten financial years from 2016 to 2025.
On the other side: The Duarte Family
Glória Duarte, 81 years old, blind, widowed, co-owner of the lands of the Boa Vista Mine. She survives on a pension of R$ 1,600 per month (≈ US$ 180). An amount insufficient to buy antibiotics. Without regular access to medical appointments.
Her husband, Jesus Duarte — 90 years old, patriarch of the family — died in 2025. In his last months of life, he needed to urinate with a catheter and used an improvised construction bucket because he could not afford adequate medical treatment. When the victim dies during the process, no certification erases that remediation failure.
During the 10 years of active litigation, 06 elderly co-owners died in conditions of extreme vulnerability. CMOC's petitions in the case file describe the family's situation as "extremely comfortable".
On March 19, 2025, TJ-GO ordered the reversal of the burden of proof in the proceedings: it now falls on CMOC to demonstrate that it does not operate on the claimed land.

THE SHIELD — 17 ESG RECOGNITIONS

SPECIFICATIONS OF ESG CERTIFICATIONS, RATINGS AND AWARDS

Complete specifications of each ESG certification, global rating and sectoral award publicly displayed by CMOC Group / CMOC Brasil, with issuing entities and verifiable primary sources. Presented in the same order as the five portfolio categories.
1. AGENCY RATINGS (3)
MSCI ESG Rating AA — Top 11% globally in non-ferrous metals
Issuing entity: MSCI Inc. — New York, USA (global financial data company)

The MSCI ESG Rating is the ESG rating most referenced by global institutional investors. It assesses more than 1,000 KPIs distributed across 35 thematic Key Issues by sector. For the non-ferrous metals sector (code 10102050), explicit material themes include Community Relations, Health & Safety, Land Use & Biodiversity and Business Ethics.

The rating has a Controversy Categories mechanism (5 levels), whereby serious adverse events — classified as Red Flag (Category 4–5) — may automatically lower the score. The Duarte case is not recorded as a controversy in the rating in any of the three financial years in which CMOC maintained the AA.

CMOC has maintained the AA for the third consecutive year: 2023, 2024 and 2025.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
Sustainalytics ESG Risk Rating — Management classified as "Strong"
Issuing entity: Sustainalytics — subsidiary of Morningstar Inc., Amsterdam, Netherlands / USA

The Sustainalytics ESG Risk Rating assesses residual ESG risk — that is, how much material risk is effectively not being managed by the company. The scale ranges from 0 to 100, with categories: Negligible (0–10), Low (10–20), Medium (20–30), High (30–40) and Severe (40+). The management component classifies the quality of internal processes as weak, average, adequate or strong.

CMOC received a management classification of "strong", indicating that, in Sustainalytics' assessment, the company's management processes for material ESG risks are considered robust.

Wind China ESG Rating AAA
Issuing entity: Wind Information Co., Ltd. (万得资讯) — Shanghai, China

Wind Information is the largest financial data platform in China, covering more than 90% of companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Its Top 100 Best ESG Practices of Chinese Listed Companies ranking assesses companies exclusively on the Chinese domestic market, with a methodology distinct from Western agencies.

CMOC was included in this ranking for the first time in 2025, obtaining the maximum AAA classification. The achievement was announced in the same official post that confirmed the group's other active ESG certifications, published in September 2025 on X (@cmoc_group) and confirmed in full in the Annual Report 2025 filed with HKEX.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
2. ESG INVESTMENT INDICES (2)
FTSE4Good Index Series — included since 2024
Issuing entity: FTSE Russell — subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), London, United Kingdom

FTSE4Good is a global benchmark equity index for institutional ESG strategies. Inclusion requires a positive assessment against more than 300 ESG indicators organized into five dimensions. For high-impact sectors such as mining, the Human Rights & Community dimension is especially demanding:

  • Human rights policy published and approved at board level
  • Documented operational due diligence process for human rights
  • Accessible and effective grievance mechanism for affected communities
  • Documented remediation process for verified impacts
  • Public disclosure of impacts on surrounding communities

Inclusion is reviewed semi-annually (June and December). CMOC was included for the first time in 2024.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
S&P Global Sustainability Yearbook (China Edition) — 3rd consecutive inclusion
Issuing entity: S&P Global Sustainable1 — New York, USA

Inclusion in the Yearbook requires performance in the top 15% of the industry in the Corporate Sustainability Assessment (CSA), an instrument that evaluates more than 7,690 companies globally. The process necessarily includes a Media & Stakeholder Analysis (MSA), a mechanism designed to capture controversies in verifiable public media — including land disputes with public repercussion.

CMOC was included for three consecutive years (2023, 2024 and 2025), which implies approval in the MSA in all those financial years. The 2025 edition lists 780 companies selected from those evaluated by the CSA.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
3. AUDITED CERTIFICATIONS (6)
ISO 14001:2015 — Environmental Management System
Issuing entity: ISO (International Organization for Standardization) — Geneva, Switzerland / audited by a body accredited by INMETRO and IAF

ISO 14001:2015 is the international reference standard for environmental management systems. Certification is issued by accredited bodies through independent external auditing with a three-year cycle and annual surveillance.

Clause 4.2 — Clause of direct relevance to the Duarte case: Understanding the needs and expectations of interested parties — explicitly requires identification of all relevant interested parties, including landowners or claimants within the operation's area of influence. The identification of an active land dispute with co-owners is therefore a normative obligation arising from this certification.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
ISO 45001:2018 — Occupational Health and Safety Management System
Issuing entity: ISO / bodies accredited by INMETRO and IAF

ISO 45001:2018 is the international standard for occupational health and safety. Its high-level structure explicitly includes obligations of consultation and participation of interested parties in decisions affecting their working conditions and surroundings.

Clause 4.2 — Understanding the needs and expectations of interested parties: the same structural obligation as ISO 14001, applied to the OHS context and social surroundings.

Clause 5.4 — Consultation and participation of workers: requires a documented process of consultation and participation of workers and communities affected by the operation's activities.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
ISO 9001 — Quality Management System
Issuing entity: ISO / accredited certification body

ISO 9001 is the global quality management standard, applicable to any organization regardless of size or sector. Its Clause 4.1 — Understanding the organization and its context — requires identification of relevant internal and external issues, including material legal risks that may affect the organization's operational continuity.

A land dispute with maximum exposure estimated at USD 3.5 billion over an operation responsible for USD 1.068 billion in annual revenue is, by normative definition, a relevant contextual issue required by ISO 9001.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
RMI Certified / RMAP — Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (includes Boa Vista Mine)
Issuing entity: Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) / Responsible Business Alliance (RBA) — Alexandria, Virginia, USA

RMAP is the most widely adopted mineral due diligence program globally for auditing the entire mineral chain — from mine to final product. It is fully aligned with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (5 steps). In October 2025, RMAP was recognized by the European Commission as the first and only scheme approved for compliance with the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation (CMR).

The 5 steps of the OECD framework applied by RMAP include:

  • Step 1 — Supply chain management system (due diligence policy)
  • Step 2 — Supply chain risk assessment
  • Step 3 — Risk response strategy — mandatorily includes the implementation of a Grievance Mechanism
  • Step 4 — Independent third-party audit
  • Step 5 — Annual public due diligence report

The Boa Vista Mine — site of the Duarte litigation — is expressly included in the scope of CMOC's RMAP certification.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
NOSA HSE 5 Stars — Excellence in Health, Safety and Environment
Issuing entity: NOSA (National Occupational Safety Association) — South Africa (founded in the 1950s)

NOSA is a South African organization specialized in health, safety and the environment, with more than 70 years of operation. Its Five Star certification system classifies HSE excellence on a scale of 1 to 5 stars, with 5 being the maximum level — obtained through on-site auditing with quantitative performance and documentation criteria. It is the only certification in CMOC's portfolio whose issuing entity is not European, American or Chinese.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
The Copper Mark "Fully Met" — TFM, Tenke Fungurume Mining (Congo/DRC)
Issuing entity: The Copper Mark — independent organization, United Kingdom; aligned with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and the London Metal Exchange (LME)

The Copper Mark evaluates 32 ESG criteria organized in five pillars: governance, human rights, community, environment, and worker well-being. TFM (Tenke Fungurume Mining), CMOC's subsidiary in Congo/DRC, became in June 2024 the first mine in Africa to receive the Copper Mark. In October 2025, it obtained the Fully Met classification — the first mine in the world to reach the maximum level on all 32 criteria.

Relevant connection: IXM S.A. (Geneva) — the wholly-owned CMOC trading company that markets Brazilian niobium from the Boa Vista Mine — joined the Copper Mark as a partner in July 2024.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
4. SCALE RANKINGS (2)
Forbes Global 2000 — 630th global position (2025)
Issuing entity: Forbes — USA (annual ranking of publicly traded companies)

The Forbes Global 2000 is the annual ranking of the world's 2,000 largest publicly traded companies, based on four combined metrics: revenue, profit, assets and market value. In the 2025 edition, CMOC reached the 630th global position and the 77th position among Chinese companies — classified among the world's largest miners. The individual positions per metric were: 440th in revenue and 523rd in profit.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
Fortune China 500 — 138th position (2025) — 8th consecutive participation
Issuing entity: Fortune China — Chinese edition of Fortune magazine (USA)

Fortune China 500 is the annual ranking of the 500 largest companies in China by gross revenue. In the July 2025 edition, CMOC rose from 145th (2024) to 138th position, marking its 8th consecutive participation in the ranking.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK
5. BRAZILIAN SECTORAL AWARDS (4)
All awards below were received after the TJ-GO decision of reversal of the burden of proof on 03/19/2025
27th Mining-Metallurgical Industry Excellence Award (July/2025)
Issuing entity: Minérios & Minerales Magazine — Brazilian sectoral editorial entity

Granted during the 16th Opex Workshop (Minascentro, Belo Horizonte, July 30–31, 2025), with an independent jury that evaluated 190 entered projects and selected 35 winners across different categories.

Awarded project: "Performance improvement in the pyrochlore concentration process" — Boa Vista Fresh Rock Plant, Ouvidor-GO.

Critical contextual fact: The Boa Vista Fresh Rock plant is precisely the unit located in the area judicially claimed by the Duarte Family. The award was granted 133 days after the TJ-GO decision of reversal of the burden of proof (03/19/2025) and during the window of regulatory silence at HKExNews.

Mining & Communities Award 2025 — two categories (05/28/2025)
Issuing entity: Brasil Mineral Magazine — 10th Mining & Communities Seminar, Belo Horizonte

First edition of the award, held during the 10th Mining & Communities Seminar (05/28/2025, Belo Horizonte). CMOC was the only company awarded in two categories — an unprecedented feat among all participants.

Category 1 — Rescue and Valorization of Cultures and Traditions: Project "Cerrado Imaterial – Berço da Vida" — developed in partnership with Bela Vista Cultural, with sponsorship via the Rouanet Law. Declared impact: 11,000+ students and teachers.

Category 2 — Participatory Social-Environmental Responsibility: Project "Construction of small earth dams and recovery of springs".

Critical contextual fact: The award was received 70 days after the TJ-GO decision of reversal of the burden of proof (03/19/2025) and during the 414-day window of silence at HKExNews. In the same period when the company received awards for relations with communities, the Duarte Family remained without any form of compensation or documented contact.

SDG Brazil Seal 2025
Issuing entity: UN Global Compact in Brazil

Recognition granted by the UN Global Compact in Brazil to companies that declare alignment of their activities with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda. The seal has a declaratory and public recognition character, without independent operational auditing.

SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for Implementation) are directly invocable in the context of the Duarte litigation, given that they involve access to justice and corporate responsibility.

VERIFIABLE FACTS — HOW TO CHECK

THE AUDIENCE — 175,000 PEOPLE NOT INFORMED

Through these 17 instruments, CMOC presents itself to the world as a benchmark of responsible conduct. The aggregate audience exposed to this ESG communication on corporate official channels (verified through May 2026) exceeds 175,000 followers:
Channel Verified number Source
LinkedIn CMOC Brasil 102,327–102,547 linkedin.com
LinkedIn CMOC International 40,136–43,200 linkedin.com
Instagram @cmocbrasil 14,000–19,000 instagram.com
Facebook CMOC Brasil 18,388–18,390 facebook.com
Combined Total ~175,000+ (Excluding X and Site)
Independent Investigation
PART II — THE 21 NORMATIVE OBLIGATIONS
Normative Framework of Obligations — Duarte Family Land Litigation (TJGO No. )

■ Premises of the Obligations

  1. CMOC Group Limited is a mining company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX: 03993), subject to the Main Board Listing Rules, the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571), the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) and HKFRS standards — equivalent to international IFRS.
  2. CMOC publicly displays 17 active ESG recognitions — 3 agency ratings, 2 investment indices, 6 audited certifications, 2 scale rankings and 4 sectoral awards —, each constituting formal acceptance of the methodologies and requirements of the issuing body.
  3. Since 03/30/2015, case TJGO No. has been pending: a land dispute over the lands where the Boa Vista Mine operates. In 10 years: 6 elderly co-owners died in documented destitution. On 03/19/2025, TJ-GO ordered the reversal of the burden of proof — it now falls on CMOC to demonstrate that it does not operate on claimed land. Glória Duarte, 81 years old, blind, illiterate, widowed, survives on US$ 180 per month, without access to medication, awaiting two urgent surgeries. Compensation paid to the family over 10 years: US$ 0.00. Provision for the litigation risk: R$ 0.00.

■ GROUP 1 — FINANCIAL, ACCOUNTING AND CAPITAL MARKETS

Subgroup A — Binding Hard Law (HKEX/SFC)
Source: public law of capital markets — binding regardless of acceptance. Enforcement: Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong + HKEX Listing Division. All immediately enforceable with measurable silence.
Obligation 1 — HKEX Rule 13.09(1)(a) — Immediate Disclosure of Inside Information

Obligation to publish an announcement on HKExNews within 2 hours of becoming aware of a material event. The TJ-GO decision of 03/19/2025 meets all the elements of the SFC's definition of inside information: specific, non-public information with reasonable potential to affect the share price of issuer HKEX:03993. Type: obligation to disclose. Verifiable silence: 414 days.

Where to Verify
  • HKExNews — official regulatory channel https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/3993_i.htm Filter by date from 03/19/2025; any announcement about the litigation would be listed here if published.
  • Complete historical archive of CMOC announcements https://www.hkexnews.hk Search by code 03993, type "announcement", period 03/19/2025 to 05/11/2026.
  • Comparison In the same period, verify announcements about ESG awards, financial results and other voluntary communications — the absence of the litigation, contrasted with the active presence of other topics, documents the selective silence.
Obligation 2 — IAS 37 §14 and §86 — Provision for Material Contingency

Binding HKFRS standard. The three cumulative criteria of IAS 37 are met by the public facts: (1) present obligation since 03/30/2015; (2) probability greater than 50% after the reversal of the burden of proof on 03/19/2025; (3) reliable estimate under Art. 1,216 of the Brazilian Civil Code. Type: obligation to record provision and/or disclose explanatory note. Provision recognized over ten financial years: R$ 0.00.

Where to Verify
Obligation 3 — IAS 10 — Events After the Reporting Period

Binding HKFRS standard, distinct from and cumulative to IAS 37. The TJ-GO decision of 03/19/2025 occurred after the close of the 2024 financial year and before the signing of the AR 2025 on 03/27/2026 — a material subsequent event by normative definition. Absent from the 338 pages of the AR 2025 audited by Deloitte. Type: obligation to disclose in a note to the financial statements.

Where to Verify
  • AR 2025 — 338 pp. https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Search for "subsequent events", "post balance sheet", "Goiás", "TJ-GO", "Duarte", "burden of proof".
  • Risk section of the AR 2025 and Note on contingencies (Note XIII) Verify whether the litigation appears in any form. Absence in both fields is cumulative with the IAS 37 violation.
Obligation 4 — IAS 36 §59 + IFRS 3 §32 — Impairment Test on the Brazil CGU

Binding HKFRS standards. Multiple external indicators under §59 are documented as present over the Brazil CGU since 2015. IFRS 3 §32 requires mandatory annual goodwill testing without exception. Brazil CGU intangibles: RMB 25.38 billion. Type: obligation to act (perform and document the test). Documented tests for the Brazil CGU over ten financial years: zero.

Where to Verify
  • AR 2025 — intangibles and goodwill section https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Search for "impairment test", "CGU", "Brazil segment", "intangible assets", "niobium", "concession".
  • Accounting note on intangibles Verify whether the test was performed, what methodology (value in use or fair value less costs), what assumptions, and whether impairment indicators were identified or dismissed with justification.
  • Declared accounting policy (Note III §36) Verify whether the company's own policy declares the testing obligation — and whether documented practice is consistent with that declaration.
Obligation 5 — IAS 1 §25 — Going Concern Assessment of the Brazil CGU

Binding HKFRS standard. Unprovisioned contingent liability of USD 3.5 billion (maximum under Art. 1,216 of the Brazilian Civil Code) equals 119% of the group's consolidated 2025 profit — a material indicator for going concern assessment of the Brazil CGU. Type: obligation to assess and disclose. Absent in all ten Annual Reports of the period.

Where to Verify
  • AR 2025 — going concern section and management note https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Search for "going concern", "material uncertainty", "Brazil operations".
  • Deloitte's opinion and Risk section Verify whether the auditor included an emphasis-of-matter paragraph on going concern or material uncertainty. Verify whether the land litigation appears as a risk to the continuity of Brazilian operations.
Obligation 6 — HKEX ESG Reporting Guide KPI B8 — Periodic Reporting of Community Impacts

Periodic reporting obligation, mandatory for Main Board issuers since the 2021 financial year — distinct from Rule 13.09, which is event-based. The dispute with co-owners claiming the lands of the main operation is a matter for mandatory reporting under KPI B8 in ten consecutive annual reports. Type: obligation to disclose periodically. Mention of the case in any CMOC ESG report: zero.

Where to Verify
Obligation 7 — Hong Kong Companies Ordinance Cap. 622 — Directors' Fiduciary Responsibility

Hong Kong public law. The directors' fiduciary duty to ensure that material risks are identified, managed and disclosed personally binds the signatories of each Annual Report. Systematic omission across ten consecutive financial years exposes directors to breach of fiduciary duty with personal liability. Type: obligation to act, with a dimension of personal responsibility.

Where to Verify
  • AR 2025 — list of signing directors https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Section "Directors and Senior Management".
  • History of ARs (2016–2024) https://www.hkexnews.hk Code 03993 — identify the signing directors of each financial year to establish the perimeter of individual responsibility.
  • Disclosure of conflicts and risks to the board Verify in the ARs whether the audit committee (Corporate Governance Report) reported review of material legal contingencies in Brazil.
Subgroup B — Binding Hard Law (Brazilian / Tax Law)
Source: Brazilian federal legislation and mining regulation. Enforcement: ANM, Federal Revenue Service, AGU.
Obligation 8 — IAS 24 + Law 14,596/2023 + Decree 9,406/2018 — Opacity of Intra-Group Transaction and CFEM

IAS 24 (binding HKFRS) requires disclosure of the terms and pricing criteria of related-party transactions — the entire niobium production is exported from CMOC Brasil to IXM S.A. Geneva (100% CMOC) without disclosure of the transfer price. Law 14,596/2023 and Decree 9,406/2018 require arm's length operations and CFEM levy on real revenue. Estimated CFEM owed 2016–2025: R$ 344 million. Type: obligation to disclose (IAS 24) and tax obligation (CFEM) — the latter with a conditional component dependent on the effective transfer price.

Where to Verify
Subgroup C — Contractual Obligation by Certification
Source: voluntary acceptance of certification creating a contractual link with the issuing body. Enforcement: certifying body (ISO, RMAP). Direct consequence: invalidity of active certification.
Obligation 9 — ISO 9001:2015, Clause 4.1 — Management of Material Legal Risks

Active certification. Clause 4.1 requires identification, documentation and management of all material legal risks. The TJGO litigation with exposure of USD 3.5 billion is, by normative definition, a first-order risk. This is the structural precondition for Subgroup A: without the risk being recorded in the management system, none of the accounting and disclosure obligations can be fulfilled. Type: obligation to act (record and manage).

Where to Verify

■ GROUP 2 — HUMANITARIAN

Subgroup A — Binding Hard Law (Brazilian Law / International Treaties)
Source: Brazilian federal law and ratified international treaties — binding regardless of acceptance. Enforcement: Public Prosecutor's Office (MPGO, Elderly Prosecutor's Office), Senacon/DPDC, IACHR.
Obligation 10 — CRPD Arts. 12 and 13 (Decree 6,949/2009) — Specific Accessibility for Glória Duarte

Hierarchy equivalent to a constitutional amendment in Brazil. Art. 13 requires effective procedural accommodation for persons with disabilities in access to justice. Any grievance mechanism that does not specifically accommodate a blind and illiterate litigant is inaccessible by normative definition — autonomously compromising FTSE4Good and RMAP compliance on a reflexive basis. Type: obligation to act (ensure accessibility). Hierarchy: constitutional.

Where to Verify
Obligation 11 — Statute of the Elderly Arts. 71, 96 and 97 (Law 10,741/2003) — Full Protection and Criminal Dimension

Brazilian federal law. Art. 71 guarantees absolute priority of proceedings. Arts. 96-97 classify conduct that exposes the elderly to risk or impairs their means of subsistence, with criminal sanction and active standing of the Public Prosecutor's Office. The description of Glória Duarte's condition as "extremely comfortable" in CMOC's procedural petitions may constitute an autonomous violation of Arts. 96-97. Type: obligation not to act, with autonomous criminal dimension.

Where to Verify
  • Case file TJGO No. Verify petitions describing the plaintiff's health condition and CMOC's procedural response.
  • MPGO — Prosecutor's Office for the Defense of the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities https://www.mpgo.mp.br Verify whether there is an inquiry or proceeding initiated in relation to the case; the Public Prosecutor's Office may act on its own initiative under Arts. 96-97.
  • CPT Goiás / DPU Publicly available reports on the case — verify description of the family's health and housing conditions.
Obligation 12 — UDHR Art. 17 + Pact of San José Art. 21 — Right to Property and Fair Compensation

Art. 21 of the Pact of San José has supralegal hierarchy in Brazil and direct applicability. Art. 17 of the UDHR has an interpretive function. Extraction of 86,548 tonnes of niobium without compensation in ten years objectively meets the typology of deprivation without fair compensation. Type: obligation to remediate. Compensation paid over ten years: USD 0.00.

Where to Verify
Obligation 13 — CDC Art. 37 + EU Green Claims Directive — Structural Greenwashing

CDC Art. 37 classifies misleading advertising by omission as an offense with immediate sanction in Brazil (Senacon/DPDC). Active ESG communication to 175,000 followers without mention of the Duarte case, sustained by 17 recognitions based on criteria that the facts demonstrate are not being met, objectively meets the typology. This is the hinge obligation between the two groups: CMOC could only violate the obligations of Group 1 because it never fulfilled those of Group 2. Type: obligation not to act (cease) and to remediate. EU Green Claims Directive: future enforcement in the European market.

Where to Verify
Subgroup B — Hard Law with Future Effectiveness Schedule
Source: foreign legislation in force (LkSG) and European directive under transposition (CSDDD). Enforcement: BAFA (Germany) for immediate LkSG; national European authorities for CSDDD starting in 2027.
Obligation 14 — LkSG §§5-7, 10 (present) + CSDDD Arts. 7 and 9 (future)

The German LkSG has been in force since 01/01/2023 and triggers a due diligence obligation on German industrial buyers of niobium — automotive and steelmaking sectors — which in turn creates an obligation on their suppliers, including IXM/CMOC. BAFA fine: up to 2% of global revenue. CSDDD has a mandatory transposition by July 2028; for companies with European revenue above EUR 1.5 billion, application is foreseen as of 2027. CMOC operates in Europe via IXM Geneva and direct niobium buyers. Type: obligation to act (due diligence, corrective measures, reporting).

Where to Verify
  • BAFA — public registry of LkSG reports https://www.bafa.de/DE/Lieferketten/lksg_node.html Verify whether German industrial niobium buyers (ThyssenKrupp, Outokumpu, automotive sectors) have published due diligence reports including CMOC/IXM as an assessed supplier.
  • IXM S.A. — institutional website https://www.ixm.com Verify whether there is a published due diligence report on the Brazilian niobium chain.
  • Copper Mark — list of participants https://coppermark.org/participants Verify IXM's status as a partner and whether the scope includes Brazilian niobium.
  • CSDDD — transposition schedule by country https://eur-lex.europa.eu Verify the current transposition status in each Member State.
Subgroup C — Contractual Obligation by Certification
Source: voluntary acceptance of certification or index creating a contractual link. Enforcement: FTSE Russell, RMI/RMAP, ISO, S&P Global, certifying bodies. Direct consequence: invalidity or exclusion.
Obligation 15 — ISO 14001/45001 Clause 4.2 — Identification and Consultation of Interested Parties

Active certifications. Clause 4.2 requires formal identification of all relevant interested parties, including land claimants. The Duarte Family is an identifiable interested party since 03/30/2015. Precondition of all of Group 2: without formal identification, none of the due diligence, grievance and remediation obligations can be structured. Type: obligation to act (identify and consult).

Where to Verify
Obligation 16 — FTSE4Good + RMI/RMAP (OECD) + MSCI — Due Diligence on Human Rights and Land Use

Explicit active conditions of inclusion and certification, with the Boa Vista Mine expressly included in the RMAP scope. Documented operational due diligence on land claimants is a maintenance requirement, not merely an entry requirement. Documented impact assessment on the Duarte case in ten years: zero. Type: obligation to act (perform, document and publish).

Where to Verify
Obligation 17 — FTSE4Good + RMI/RMAP Step 3 + UNGPs Principle 31 — Accessible and Effective Grievance Mechanism

Step 3 of RMAP makes the Grievance Mechanism mandatory as a certification condition. The seven effectiveness criteria of UNGPs Principle 31 are normative requirements, not aspirations. For Glória Duarte — 81 years old, blind, illiterate — any mechanism that does not accommodate her specific condition is inaccessible by definition: seven criteria, seven non-compliances. Documented mechanism: zero. Type: obligation to act (implement and maintain).

Where to Verify
  • CMOC Brasil institutional website https://cmocbrasil.com Verify existence of a grievance channel for communities external to the operation; verify whether there is an accessible format (audio, in-person service, intermediary).
  • CMOC Brasil Sustainability Report 2024 https://sustentabilidade.cmocbrasil.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Relatorio_de_Sustentabilidade_CMOC_2024-v4-1.pdf Search for "grievance mechanism", "grievance", "community ombudsman", "external reporting channel".
  • RMAP — Boa Vista Mine audit report and TJGO case file Verify whether Step 3 of OECD was assessed as fulfilled by the auditor. Verify in the case file whether CMOC made any documented extrajudicial contact with the Duarte Family.
Obligation 18 — GRI 413 + SASB Metals & Mining — Sectoral Reporting of Community Impacts

CMOC declared adherence to GRI and SASB in the AR 2025 and the Sustainability Report — declared adherence creates a binding reporting obligation toward the frameworks. GRI 413 requires disclosure of operations with negative impacts on local communities. SASB requires the percentage of reserves in areas of community tension and the number of incidents involving community rights. The Duarte case is mandatory material in both. Mention of the case in ten financial years of ESG reports: zero. Type: obligation to disclose.

Where to Verify
Obligation 19 — Certification Contracts — Obligation to Notify Certifying Bodies

Standard contractual obligation in ISO, RMAP and FTSE4Good certifications: material events affecting scope or compliance must be notified to the certifying body. The TJ-GO decision of 03/19/2025 directly affects the Boa Vista Mine, expressly included in the RMAP scope. Omission of notification: 414 days. Type: obligation to act (notify). Autonomous consequence vis-à-vis the certifying bodies, regardless of the judicial outcome.

Where to Verify
Subgroup D — Soft Law with Contractual Effect
Source: instruments not binding by themselves, but incorporated as a condition of active certifications and indices. Enforcement: indirect — via cancellation of certification or exclusion from index.
Obligation 20 — UNGPs Principles 13 and 22 — Obligation of Remediation

UNGPs Principle 13 (avoid causing adverse impacts) and Principle 22 (provide effective remediation upon identification of impact) are soft law incorporated as normative conditions for maintenance in FTSE4Good and RMAP. The violation is not the legitimate exercise of the right of procedural defense — it is the continued extraction of USD 3.5 billion in accumulated revenue without any documented parallel humanitarian measure, while the adverse impact on identifiable persons has been on file since 2015. Six co-owners died during the proceedings. Documented remediation measures for the Duarte case: zero. Type: obligation to remediate.

Where to Verify
Obligation 21 — IFC Performance Standard 5 — Economic Displacement and Livelihood Restoration

De facto standard adopted by the global mining sector — direct applicability to CMOC conditioned on formal demand by financier or institutional buyer (conditional component). PS5 specifically governs economic displacement without physical resettlement — precisely the condition of the Duarte Family. It requires an income restoration plan to pre-project level and non-continuation of operations on claimed land until resolution through fair compensation. Documented restoration plan for the Duarte family: zero. Type: obligation to act (assess, plan and remediate).

Where to Verify
Independent Investigation
PART III — FINANCIAL, ACCOUNTING AND CAPITAL MARKETS VIOLATIONS
Violations 1 to 9 — Unfulfilled Obligations in Capital Markets and Certifications

Violation 1 – ISO 9001 Clauses 4.1 and 6.1 – Management of material legal risks

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Clauses 4.1 and 6.1 of ISO 9001 require the organization to identify, assess and manage relevant external issues, including legal proceedings that may affect financial stability and operational continuity. The standard requires that first-order risks — such as billion-dollar land disputes over the primary operation's territory — be formally mapped and mitigated within the Quality Management System (QMS).
WHAT CMOC DID
The company entirely excluded the land dispute and the Duarte family from its risk mapping and stakeholder identification processes. The CMOC Brasil Sustainability Report 2024 contains no mention whatsoever of the TJGO proceedings, demonstrating that the legal risk did not formally exist within the audited QMS. This systemic omission blocked the internal flow of information, preventing governance from having the formal record needed to assess the contingency.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Brasil Sustainability Report 2024 https://sustentabilidade.cmocbrasil.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Relatorio_de_Sustentabilidade_CMOC_2024-v4-1.pdf Total absence of any reference to the TJGO proceedings, the Duarte family, or a land dispute in the operation's risk and stakeholder map.
TJGO Case No. – Boa Vista Mine http://eproc.tjgo.jus.br Material existence of an active land dispute over the primary operation's territory, with billion-dollar exposure, constituting a first-order legal risk.
Blood Niobium Public Dossier https://bloodniobium.org Factual consolidation of years of litigation, the family's extreme vulnerability and the absence of compensation — a scenario ignored in the corporate risk register.
Questions for Investigation
  • Through what internal mechanism or managerial decision was the multi-billion-dollar dispute actively excluded from the ISO 9001 risk mapping?
  • How did independent INMETRO/ISO auditors approve certification of an operation that omits the land dispute over its primary asset?
  • Was the exclusion of this risk from the QMS a deliberate strategy by the Brazilian subsidiary to conceal the contingency from the parent company and the Board of Directors?
  • Are there internal legal committee records confirming knowledge of this liability that was never integrated into the management system?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 2 – IAS 37 §§ 14 and 86 – Provision for material contingency

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
IAS 37 requires the recognition of a financial provision or full disclosure in a footnote whenever three cumulative criteria are met: a present obligation, a probability exceeding 50% of an outflow of resources, and a reliable estimate of the amount. The standard mandates a review of assessments whenever material procedural events — such as a reversal of the burden of proof — alter the probability of loss.
WHAT CMOC DID
The company maintained the litigation's loss probability classification as "low" in the Annual Report 2025, with the provision fixed at zero. The footnote text remained identical to that used continuously since 2016, deliberately disregarding the TJGO ruling of 19 March 2025 that reversed the burden of proof against CMOC.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group Limited https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf The Contingencies Note classifies the litigation as carrying "low probability" and zero financial provision, with no mention whatsoever of the lost burden of proof.
Annual Reports 2016–2024 – CMOC Group Limited (Historical) https://www.hkexnews.hk The text relating to legal contingencies in Brazil is copied and pasted across all reports, evidencing the complete absence of legal risk reassessment over the decade.
Independent Auditor's Report (Deloitte) – AR 2025 https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Approval of the financial statements without qualification and without an emphasis paragraph on the land dispute, disregarding the materiality of the risk aggravated by the Goiás courts.
Questions for Investigation
  • What independent legal opinion supported the unchanged "low probability" classification presented to Deloitte after the reversal of the burden of proof?
  • Did CMOC's Audit Committee debate the maximum loss scenarios provided under Article 1,216 of the Brazilian Civil Code?
  • Why was there no adequate disclosure of the accounting impact of the procedural reversal in the financial statements signed in March 2026?
  • Did Deloitte perform substantive testing on this specific contingency before issuing a clean opinion?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 3 – HKEX Rule 13.09(1)(a) – Inside information and disclosure

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Rule 13.09 of the HKEX Main Board Listing Rules, together with Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) guidelines, requires the publication of an announcement on the official HKExNews channel within 2 hours of a company becoming aware of "inside information." Inside information is non-public, specific information with a reasonable likelihood of affecting the share price.
WHAT CMOC DID
Following the adverse TJGO ruling of 19 March 2025, CMOC imposed absolute silence on its regulatory disclosure channel. More than 400 days elapsed without any announcement alerting investors to the risk to the asset that generated USD 1.068 billion in revenue in 2025. During this same period, the company actively published financial results and ESG awards.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Announcements on HKExNews (19/03/2025 to 27/03/2026) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/3993_i.htm Absolute absence of any communications regarding the Duarte family litigation or the TJGO ruling, confirming a price-sensitive omission on the official channel.
Interim Report H1 2025 (Example of selective silence) https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2025/0826/2025082600416.pdf Mandatory report issued months after the TJGO ruling that details finances while rigorously concealing the altered legal status of the mine in Brazil.
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group Limited https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Confirmation that the judicial setback was not treated — even belatedly — as inside information to be declared to minority shareholders.
Questions for Investigation
  • Who authorized the decision not to report the reversal of the burden of proof within the 2-hour window stipulated by the SFC?
  • Was an announcement draft ever prepared by the legal team and subsequently vetoed by the Board of Directors?
  • Was the Exchange's Listing Division informally notified of the omission in an attempt to obtain a temporary waiver?
  • What was the reasoning used to disqualify a contingency of up to USD 3.5 billion as "not price-sensitive"?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 4 – IAS 10 § 21 – Subsequent events

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
IAS 10 requires an entity to disclose material subsequent events — events occurring between the balance sheet date and the date the financial statements are authorized for issue. Failure to disclose prevents users of the financial statements from properly assessing the company's position.
WHAT CMOC DID
The TJGO ruling reversing the burden of proof was handed down on 19 March 2025, a critical event that occurred after the close of the 2024 financial year. Nevertheless, across the 338 pages of the Annual Report 2025 — signed 373 days later — the company did not insert a single line in the "Subsequent Events" note, entirely omitting the deterioration of its legal position.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group Limited https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf No mention of the Goiás Court of Justice ruling in the Subsequent Events section, failing the required disclosure of a material development.
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group (Risk Section) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf The issuer's risk matrix in the report ignores the March 2025 event, consolidating the documentary suppression within the final set of accounts.
Questions for Investigation
  • Was the non-inclusion of the TJGO ruling as a subsequent event directed by the auditors or decided unilaterally by CMOC?
  • Was the matter debated during the financial close process and subsequently removed from the final version of the accounts?
  • Why was the risk of an adverse civil judgment against the niobium operation not considered "material"?
  • Were any instructions issued to withhold the transmission of Brazilian judicial updates to the central accounting function in Hong Kong?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 5 – IAS 36 / IFRS 3 – Impairment test on the Brazil CGU

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
IAS 36 requires an impairment test whenever external indicators suggest an asset has lost value, such as litigation over concessions or a reduction in reserves. IFRS 3 adds that goodwill balances must be tested annually, regardless of indicators, at the Cash-Generating Unit (CGU) level.
WHAT CMOC DID
Despite carrying RMB 25.38 billion in intangible assets tied to the Brazil operation, CMOC has not published — in ten years — the assumptions or results of any specific impairment test for that CGU. The company states in its accounting policy (Note III §36) that it conducts such tests, directly contradicting the factual absence of that disclosure from its financial statements.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group (Intangible Assets and Goodwill) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Zero presentation of financial assumptions, calculation methodology or conclusions of the mandatory impairment test for the Brazil unit.
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group (Accounting Policies, Note III §36) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf The company's own stated policy acknowledges the obligation to test against indicators, exposing the glaring contradiction between the rule and its actual practice.
Questions for Investigation
  • Did Deloitte attest to the recoverability of the Brazil CGU while ignoring the premise of a judicial liability that may reach 119% of annual net profit?
  • How does CMOC justify maintaining intangible values intact when the fundamental right to extract subsoil minerals is being legally contested?
  • Do audit working papers exist formally rejecting the IAS 36 triggers for the Brazilian operation?
  • Did the absence of a write-off serve the need to protect the profitability metrics required by the Asian holding company?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 6 – IAS 24 / Law 14,596/23 / Decree 9,406/18 – Opacity in intra-group transactions and CFEM

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Accounting standard IAS 24 requires full transparency and disclosure of pricing terms for related-party transactions. In Brazil, tax regulations (Transfer Pricing Law 14,596/2023 and Decree 9,406/2018) stipulate that intra-group transactions must be conducted on an arm's length basis and that mineral royalties (CFEM) must be levied on the actual corresponding revenue.
WHAT CMOC DID
The Brazilian operation transfers 100% of extracted niobium production to its Swiss trading subsidiary (IXM S.A.), omitting the intra-group transfer price from its public reports. This information blackout violates disclosure requirements and prevents public verification of potential under-invoicing that could have unlawfully reduced CFEM royalty payments owed in Brazil.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group (Related Parties) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Objective omission of arm's length criteria and the prices charged on the transfer of minerals from the Brazilian subsidiary to the Swiss trading company.
CFEM Collection System – ANM https://sistemas.anm.gov.br/arrecadacaoextra/relatorios/cfem The portal where royalty collections are recorded; the secrecy imposed on CMOC's intra-group price makes it impossible to reconcile the royalty paid against market value.
FeNb price benchmarks (e.g. Argus Media / Asian Metal) https://www.argusmedia.com International commodity indices provide the market reference that exposes the group's transparency deficit regarding the margin retained in Europe.
Questions for Investigation
  • What was the gap between the Brazil-to-Geneva transfer price and official international benchmark prices at the close of each financial year?
  • Were the royalties (CFEM) paid over the past ten years calculated on a base that was intentionally deflated at source?
  • Is Brazil's Federal Revenue Service aware of and has it audited the profit margin allocated to the subsidiary in a preferential tax jurisdiction?
  • Why does the business model the company calls "margin maximization via trading" conceal the data that would demonstrate full tax compliance?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 7 – IAS 1 § 25 – Going concern assessment

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
IAS 1 requires management to formally attest to the ability of the entity or Cash-Generating Unit to continue operations in the future (Going Concern). Where a material uncertainty is identified — such as the imminent possibility of losing the primary revenue source due to a profits-expropriation lawsuit — the company has a non-negotiable obligation to disclose the scenario in its notes to the financial statements.
WHAT CMOC DID
Faced with a potential litigation liability benchmarked under Article 1,216 of the Civil Code (restitution of all fruits harvested, estimated at USD 3.5 billion), CMOC suppressed any stress-testing of its Brazil CGU from its formal documents. The Annual Report 2025 does not discuss — in its Going Concern note — the operational viability of the mine under the scenario of the adverse judicial ruling that reversed the burden of proof.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group Limited (Going Concern Note) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Attests to operational continuity while solemnly omitting a legal exposure equivalent to more than 100% of global net profit for that financial year.
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group (General Risk Section) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Lists dozens of macroeconomic and environmental risks while remaining silent on the structural collapse that an adverse judgment would inflict on the Boa Vista Mine's cash flow.
Questions for Investigation
  • On what premise did directors sign the going concern declaration while ignoring the immediate impact of the adverse March 2025 ruling?
  • Did the Board design contingency scenarios for a potential default or technical insolvency of the Brazilian subsidiary?
  • How did Deloitte issue a clean opinion without inserting an Emphasis of Matter paragraph regarding an asset responsible for a large share of global corporate revenue?
  • Does the absence of disclosure suggest the parent company regards the Brazilian operation as expendable in the event of legal enforcement?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 8 – HKEX ESG KPI B8 – Community reporting

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
The HKEX Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) rules, through indicator KPI B8, require listed companies to report their interactions and the substantial impacts generated upon surrounding communities. The standard expects balanced and transparent information, including disclosure of severe land conflicts and rights violations affecting populations within the direct sphere of influence of the operations.
WHAT CMOC DID
Across ten consecutive annual ESG reports, the company catalogued with painstaking precision its community award donations, rural construction projects and volunteer service hours, while suppressing 100% of any mention of the 6 deaths that occurred within the litigating family and the state of induced destitution of the matriarch claiming title to the land. A systematic, selective omission sustained across a decade of official stock exchange filings.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Group ESG Reports (HKEX Repository 2016–2025) https://en.cmoc.com/html/SustainableDevelopment/Reports Searching for "Duarte," "land dispute" or any identifier of territorial conflicts returns zero results in the section that should fulfill KPI B8.
CMOC Brasil Sustainability Report 2024 https://sustentabilidade.cmocbrasil.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Relatorio_de_Sustentabilidade_CMOC_2024-v4-1.pdf Extensively mentions "harmonious coexistence" and philanthropic projects such as the "Barraginhas" programme while suppressing the fatal impacts tied to the property dispute over the mining complex.
Questions for Investigation
  • Did the local sustainability team receive directives to filter out land conflict metrics before transmitting them to the Asian corporate reporting division?
  • Will the HKEX regulatory body prosecute the issuer for delivering deliberately unbalanced ESG disclosures over an entire decade?
  • Did agencies such as MSCI award the AA rating based solely and exclusively on the incomplete narrative contained in this validated promotional material?
  • How does the corporate programme's ethics accommodate the meticulous recording of trivial donations alongside the erasure of deaths among vulnerable people within its sphere of influence?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 9 – Hong Kong Companies Ordinance Cap. 622 – Directors' fiduciary duty

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Hong Kong corporate law requires directors to discharge an inalienable personal duty of care, skill and diligence (fiduciary duty). They are legally responsible for ensuring that published reports and accounts present a true and fair view of the entity's actual situation and risks. Senior management members are not permitted to conceal liabilities that could prejudice the assets of minority shareholders.
WHAT CMOC DID
The directors signed ten successive financial statements maintaining a static characterization of a multi-billion-dollar liability as carrying "low probability," including endorsing and publishing the financial statements for the year after the dramatic reversal of circumstances at the TJGO. In doing so, the executives breached their duty of diligence, withholding from shareholders a true and fair view of the operational vulnerabilities in Brazil.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group (Corporate Governance Report) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Corporate governance minutes containing no record of any deliberation on the serious procedural setback that struck the entity's primary extraction asset in the Americas.
Historical Archive of CMOC Group Annual Reports (2016–2024) https://www.hkexnews.hk The mechanical and repeated ratification of the same contingencies note attests to the historic acquiescence of its signatories in the concealment of the Duarte case.
Questions for Investigation
  • Will the holding company activate civil and criminal accountability mechanisms against the signatory directors in Hong Kong for misleading investors?
  • Did the Audit Committee receive translations of critical developments in the Brazilian proceedings in time for the annual report close?
  • Which executives received performance bonuses based on the suppression of this contingency's recognition over the years?
  • Will the supervisory authority (SFC) prosecute the issuer for the intentional misrepresentation of data in breach of "true and fair view" requirements?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence
Independent Investigation
PART IV — HUMANITARIAN VIOLATIONS
Violations 10 to 21 — Unfulfilled Obligations in Human Rights and ESG

Violation 10 – ISO 14001/45001 Clause 4.2 – Identification of interested parties

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Clause 4.2 of ISO 14001 and ISO 45001 requires the formal, systematic and documented identification of all parties with a relevant interest in the organization's operations. In a mining context, this categorically requires the inclusion of landowners, adjacent property holders and land claimants within the mine's area of direct influence, for the purposes of impact mapping.
WHAT CMOC DID
CMOC published its stakeholder map in the Sustainability Report without including the Duarte family in any category. Simultaneously, in submissions filed before the TJGO, the company's lawyers described the situation of matriarch Glória Duarte as "extremely comfortable" — directly contradicting the evident facts of her vulnerability (advanced age, blindness, income of USD 180 per month) — and proving that no diligent process of identification and engagement was ever conducted by corporate management.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Brasil Sustainability Report 2024 https://sustentabilidade.cmocbrasil.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Relatorio_de_Sustentabilidade_CMOC_2024-v4-1.pdf The stakeholder map entirely suppresses the existence of the co-owning family, evidencing a structural failure in the certified management system.
TJGO Case No. – Boa Vista Mine http://eproc.tjgo.jus.br Petitions filed by CMOC attest to the company's departure from factual reality in classifying a vulnerable litigant as living in material comfort.
Blood Niobium Public Dossier https://bloodniobium.org The portal sets out the factual narrative (blindness, illiteracy, minimal income) demonstrating the urgency of classifying this family as a priority stakeholder.
Questions for Investigation
  • How did the ISO certification body validate compliance with standards 14001 and 45001 without requiring the inclusion of the co-owning family of the operational area in the stakeholder map?
  • Was there any documented visit by independent auditors or CMOC social managers to the Duarte family home to verify their actual living conditions?
  • Do internal records exist (non-public matrices) in which the family is listed but was intentionally excluded from the report published to the market?
  • Who was the corporate authority that approved publication of the 2024 report's stakeholder map with full knowledge of the active judicial dispute?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 11 – FTSE4Good / RMAP / MSCI – Human rights due diligence and impact assessment

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
The normative frameworks of indices such as FTSE4Good, audit programmes such as RMAP and rating methodologies such as MSCI require rigorous human rights due diligence processes. As a fundamental condition for maintaining ESG credentials, companies must conduct a formal Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) for operations in areas affected by land conflicts or social tensions.
WHAT CMOC DID
Over ten years of active conflict, CMOC never published or referenced a specific HRIA for the Boa Vista Mine encompassing the risks and abuses associated with the Duarte case. Despite this omission, the company continued to display high ESG ratings and operational certifications that — given the documented local violations — should have triggered immediate suspension or punitive downgrading of its compliance scores.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Group ESG Reports Repository https://en.cmoc.com/html/SustainableDevelopment/Reports Dozens of reports describe general ethical policies, yet no Human Rights Impact Assessment addressing the Duarte dispute has ever been published.
RMI / RMAP – Public List of Certified Facilities https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/facilities-lists/public-list/ The Boa Vista Mine appears as a due-diligence-certified operation, masking the severe conflict ignored by the programme's independent auditors.
FTSE4Good – Human Rights Controversies Methodology https://www.lseg.com/en/ftse-russell/indices/ftse4good The index's operational criteria make clear that active human rights controversies require disclosure — which the issuer withheld.
MSCI ESG Ratings – Public Search Tool https://www.msci.com/data-and-analytics/sustainability-solutions/esg-ratings-climate-search-tool The maintenance of a high rating attests to the absence of this controversy in the agency's database, suggesting a serious gap in the disclosures submitted.
Questions for Investigation
  • Did CMOC formally communicate — through private correspondence — any clarification to RMAP, FTSE or MSCI assessors regarding the existence of this land conflict?
  • Does an internal HRIA exist within the company whose findings were deemed damaging to its image and vetoed from publication?
  • What screening parameters were used by these indices to consider CMOC's due diligence effective in the face of documented deaths?
  • Were institutional investors who are signatories to the PRI (Principles for Responsible Investment) informed of the absence of these mandatory assessments?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 12 – UNGPs Principle 31 / FTSE4Good / RMAP – Inaccessible grievance mechanism

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), specifically Principle 31, require that operational grievance mechanisms be legitimate, accessible, predictable and equitable. Global ESG audits (such as RMAP and FTSE4Good eligibility criteria) condition their endorsements on the factual existence of channels through which vulnerable populations can report complaints directly to governance.
WHAT CMOC DID
The only mechanism made publicly available by CMOC (on its institutional website) is a strictly text-based digital form. This format renders the channel entirely inaccessible to matriarch Glória Duarte (aged 81, blind and illiterate). The company demonstrated no effort to provide dedicated telephone lines, community facilitators or in-person assistance over a period of ten years, formally failing the baseline accessibility requirements of corporate channels.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Brasil Institutional Website – Contact Channels https://cmocbrasil.com The complaints/ombudsman section presents itself as an exclusionary web form, lacking multimodal alternatives for persons with disabilities and for illiterate individuals.
CMOC Brasil Sustainability Report 2024 https://sustentabilidade.cmocbrasil.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Relatorio_de_Sustentabilidade_CMOC_2024-v4-1.pdf The corporate narrative of the listening mechanism omits inclusive fieldwork methodologies for the neighbouring communities impacted by the operations.
UNGPs – Official UN Document https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf Principle 31 defines the accessibility and equity benchmarks that the Brazilian subsidiary's grievance system fails to observe at the material level.
Questions for Investigation
  • Why has the company not established third-party-operated telephone ombudsman lines or conducted systematic in-person visits to the conflict area?
  • How did the RMAP audit approve the "effectiveness" of the community mechanism without testing its reach among the non-digitally-connected population in the surrounding area?
  • Are there records in the complaints channel of attempts — successful or otherwise — by community representatives acting on behalf of the Duarte family?
  • Who was the manager responsible for designing the current mechanism, and under what ESG parameters was the decision to exclude non-written interfaces based?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 13 – CRPD Arts. 12 and 13 – Access to justice for a person with a disability

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), incorporated into Brazilian law by Decree 6,949/2009 at the level of a Constitutional Amendment, establishes in Articles 12 and 13 that the State and private parties involved in litigation must provide effective procedural accommodations. Such adaptations are required to ensure equitable and comprehensible access by persons with disabilities to the judiciary and to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
WHAT CMOC DID
Throughout more than ten years of protracted litigation, CMOC confined all its interactions with matriarch Glória Duarte exclusively to voluminous text-based legal petitions filed through the electronic court system. The mining company never requested, sponsored or proposed any reasonable accommodation (audio descriptions, interpreters, on-site hearings) for an octogenarian litigant who is both blind and illiterate, subverting her substantive access to justice.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
TJGO Case No. – Record 2015–2025 http://eproc.tjgo.jus.br The case record confirms the complete absence of any proposal by CMOC to adopt accessible extrajudicial or procedural communication measures with the opposing party.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities-2.html The binding treaty attests to the scope of the constitutional infringement committed through the communicational exclusion of a doubly incapacitated litigant.
Questions for Investigation
  • Did CMOC file petitions with the presiding judge requesting that procedural acts or conciliation attempts comply with the CRPD's inclusive model?
  • Were the Public Prosecutor's Office or the local courts prompted by CMOC's lawyers to mitigate the colossal informational access disparity faced by the opposing party?
  • Does any internal guidance exist within the mining company's legal department to exploit the opposing party's incapacity as an attrition strategy?
  • How do the holding company's diversity and inclusion guidelines justify the treatment dispensed to a visually impaired interested party in Brazil?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 14 – Statute of the Elderly – Exposure to risk, destitution and deaths

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Federal Law 10,741/2003 (Statute of the Elderly) establishes absolute priority in the processing of cases involving elderly citizens. In its criminal dimension (Arts. 96 and 97), the Statute criminalizes acts of omission, exposure to danger or conduct that deliberately harms the means of physical subsistence and the psychological well-being of elderly persons, requiring that relief be provided in the face of acute vulnerability.
WHAT CMOC DID
In pursuit of its legal position over the land, CMOC indefinitely prolonged the dispute. During the decade of litigation, six elderly co-owners died in demonstrable states of destitution. While the heirs depended on the public health system without basic resources and endured structural bereavement, the mining company continued extracting billions from the contested area, cynically asserting in court filings that the family enjoyed an "extremely comfortable" lifestyle.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
TJGO Case Files (DPU / CPT Goiás Expert Reports) http://eproc.tjgo.jus.br Photographic and testimonial accounts from the Public Defender's Office proving the elderly persons' destitution (e.g. a bucket used as a urinal), directly refuting the company's "comfort" argument.
Goiás State Public Prosecutor's Office (MPGO) – Elderly Affairs Division https://www.mpgo.mp.br Body with autonomous standing to initiate criminal prosecution in relation to the vital degradation inflicted by the protraction of the litigation.
Federal Law 10,741/2003 (Statute of the Elderly) https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/l10.741.htm Normative documentation attesting to the offences that encompass the systematic refusal to mitigate harm against vulnerable elderly populations.
Questions for Investigation
  • Did the mining company proactively report to the Public Prosecutor's Office the critical conditions observed on the family's property, or did it prefer silence in order to prevail through attrition?
  • In the face of successive documented deaths, why were no preliminary injunctions sought for the advance provision of emergency medical and subsistence support?
  • What was the ethical basis on which CMOC's Legal Committee approved the filing of petitions publicly and notoriously mischaracterizing the litigants' poverty?
  • Did the Board of Directors assess the risk of criminal prosecution under Brazilian law for breaches of the Statute of the Elderly?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 15 – UDHR Art. 17 / Pact of San José Art. 21 – Deprivation of property without just compensation

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José) provide that no one may be arbitrarily deprived of their property without prior and fair compensation. Under Brazilian civil law, Article 1,216 stipulates that a possessor found to be acting in bad faith bears full responsibility to restore all fruits and benefits unlawfully extracted from the disputed land.
WHAT CMOC DID
Ignoring the pending judicial question of ownership of the land, CMOC extracted without interruption, over the course of a decade, 86,548 tonnes of niobium, converted into an estimated gross revenue of USD 3.5 billion. Throughout this formidable appropriation of mineral resources tied to the disputed soil, the total value transferred by way of compensation or socioeconomic mitigation to the co-owning family amounted to USD 0.00.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE — PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
Annual Report 2025 – CMOC Group Limited (Production and Revenue) https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2026/0327/2026032703784.pdf Officially records the massive volumes of niobium extracted from the Boa Vista Mine, generating international dividends in the absence of local compensation.
TJGO Case No. – Sentencing History http://eproc.tjgo.jus.br The complete absence of deposit slips, escrow accounts, approved financial settlement agreements, or advance payments for lost profits in the judicial records.
American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José) https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/portugues/c.convencao_americana.htm The international treaty that establishes the duty to compensate and underpins the confiscatory nature of land appropriations unilaterally extended by the company.
Questions for Investigation
  • Why did CMOC's legal department never request the creation of a litigation-linked escrow account to deposit guarantees tied to mining operations?
  • Was any preliminary settlement proposal ever formulated and rejected, or was the policy one of total blockade of extrajudicial compensation negotiations?
  • How did the controlling entity assess the probability of a judgment ordering full restitution of proceeds harvested after the burden-of-proof reversal was decreed?
  • Was the silence in reporting regarding obligations under the Pact of San José validated before advisors oriented toward international compliance?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 16 – UNGPs Principles 13 and 22 – Failure to provide humanitarian remediation

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), globally adopted by corporate standards, stipulate under Principles 13 and 22 that companies must cease contributing to operational harms and offer lawful, effective, and prompt remediation upon detecting them. This corrective assistance must occur regardless of the pace of legal proceedings or any formal admission of guilt by any party.
WHAT CMOC DID
Fully informed of the enormous vulnerabilities of the original litigants and witnessing the deaths of six family members over ten years, CMOC chose intransigence. The company omitted basic prophylactic actions such as offers of medical assistance, existential maintenance funds, or interim remediation for the occupants. It opted instead to confine its response to a prolonged, strictly legal dispute, denying the parallel humanitarian dimension of the disaster.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE – PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
Human Rights Policies / CMOC Institutional Website https://en.cmoc.com/html/AboutUs/Governance/HumanRights Published guidelines profess impeccable alignment with the UNGPs, in stark contrast to the remediation abstention materialized at the Boa Vista Mine.
TJGO Case No. – Procedural History http://eproc.tjgo.jus.br The litigation repository certifies that no petition or signed agreement was filed offering hospital care, shelter, or food assistance in response to the documented hardships.
UNGPs – UN Document https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf The non-observance of the corporate prerogative to separate harm repair from formal admission of guilt, violating the requirement to act proactively for the sake of human dignity.
Questions for Investigation
  • Which regional board of the mining company determined that humanitarian assistance negotiations be frozen pending final judgment?
  • Were ESG index providers and third-party consultants aware that remediation had been stalled despite the deaths of neighbors of the mine?
  • Did banks or international financiers intervene to question the disconnect between on-the-ground practice and the official human rights policy?
  • Does the withholding of emergency remediation from elderly persons with disabilities constitute a form of procedural intimidation endorsed by the compliance function?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 17 – LkSG / CSDDD – Due diligence failure in the European supply chain

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Germany's Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG) and the European Union's Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) impose on large European companies the non-negotiable duty to scrutinize their supply chains, diagnose operational harms at the source of raw materials, and apply corrective measures or mitigation programs against suppliers whose mines fail to respect essential social and regulatory rights.
WHAT CMOC DID
Despite the highly serious litigation being public and subject to reporting triggered by humanitarian protection bodies, no reports or alerts issued by CMOC's Swiss parent company (IXM S.A.) to its European-bloc importers are on record. The mandatory reports of major metallurgical buyers make no reference to corrective measures linked to the humanitarian breaches at the source in Goiás. The concealment extends throughout the aerospace and automotive supply ecosystem in Germany.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE – PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
BAFA (Germany) – LkSG Reporting Portal https://www.bafa.de/DE/Lieferketten/lksg_node.html The German fiscal database does not record documentation from niobium customers adopting suspensions or corrective audits in response to CMOC's serious violations.
IXM S.A. Trading – Compliance Documentation https://www.ixm.com The intermediary trading company systematically blocked disclosure of the conflict to global buyers, failing to issue the alerts required by import legislation.
Copper Mark Initiative Participants https://coppermark.org/participants Evidences institutional complicity, whereby listed intermediaries retain their seals without raising flags over the atrocities associated with the Brazilian supplier.
EUR-Lex Directives (CSDDD) https://eur-lex.europa.eu The regulatory framework that holds European industries legally accountable for investigative inaction in the reception of South American metals.
Questions for Investigation
  • Did IXM Geneva send falsified or incomplete documentation to German automakers regarding the legal contingencies of the Boa Vista Mine?
  • Was a retroactive review conducted of LkSG forms submitted by major industrial buyers of niobium from this specific extraction operation?
  • Were the German BAFA office or EU authorities formally approached with documentary evidence submitted by NGOs regarding this breach?
  • Under the scope of the CSDDD, what criminal liability do executives at the European end of the chain bear for ignoring ongoing harms attested by the courts?
Active LkSG violation, CSDDD established

Violation 18 – IFC Performance Standard 5 – Economic displacement and livelihoods

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
IFC Performance Standard 5 (IFC PS5) deals specifically with the mitigation of economic displacement. The standard requires that when a company's land use restricts the income-generating capacity or subsistence pathways of neighboring landowners or co-owners — even in the absence of physical eviction — a Livelihood Restoration Plan must be implemented compulsorily and in advance.
WHAT CMOC DID
By blocking for ten years the productive use of the lands tied to the dispute with the Duarte family, and by financially subjugating the co-owner to a meager pension of USD 180 per month, CMOC crystallized forced economic displacement. The company entirely ignored its PS5 obligations, refraining from compiling, approving, or subsidizing any income restoration plan that might have alleviated the chronic economic harm inflicted on the claimant.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE – PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Brasil Sustainability Report 2024 https://sustentabilidade.cmocbrasil.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Relatorio_de_Sustentabilidade_CMOC_2024-v4-1.pdf The complete absence of any report referencing a Livelihood Restoration Plan aimed at alleviating the financial paralysis imposed on landowners adjacent to the mining operation.
IFC Performance Standards (PS5) https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/policies-standards/performance-standards The multilateral banking standards that classify the material depletion of the claimant's means as displacement imposed by corporate intervention.
Equator Principles – Report Repository https://equator-principles.com A review of the reports attests whether lenders subject to the Equator Principles disregarded the PS5 audit requirement over the dispossessed areas in Brazil.
Questions for Investigation
  • Are there banks or international funds among CMOC Brasil's financiers whose contracts impose unconditional compliance with IFC PS5?
  • Did any banking syndication require the submission of a mitigation plan as a precondition for credit disbursement?
  • Why did the community relations department never develop frameworks to replace the income sources eliminated by the operational standstill imposed on the land?
  • Did the company's lawyers quantify that the decline of the family's income to subsistence levels was a direct by-product of property restrictions in the mine's vicinity?
Probable violation – subject to confirmation by lenders

Violation 19 – GRI 413 / SASB Metals & Mining – Omission of significant negative impacts

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
The non-financial reporting frameworks GRI (Standard 413) and SASB (EM-MM-210a.1/2) require mandatory disclosure of corporate operations that cause significant negative impacts on local communities. Companies adhering to these guidelines must explicitly address social tensions, acute agrarian conflicts, deaths linked to local litigation, and other incidents that undermine the rights of populations near the extractive facility.
WHAT CMOC DID
Over ten consecutive annual ESG reporting cycles, the mining company self-declared rigorous adherence to GRI and SASB. Alongside this voluntary submission, the company entirely purged any reference to the Duarte family's land dispute, concealing the stark reality of six deaths under legal attrition and depriving investors of an understanding of the real human liabilities hidden beneath the materiality index.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE – PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Brasil Sustainability Report 2024 https://sustentabilidade.cmocbrasil.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Relatorio_de_Sustentabilidade_CMOC_2024-v4-1.pdf The section compiling the GRI Content Index is clean of any reference to the required disclosures, falsifying the true scale of adverse local impacts.
GRI 413 Global Standards – Local Communities https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/media/1024/gri-413-local-communities-2016.pdf The guiding text strictly defines the profile of conflict events that must appear in response disclosures — precisely what the corporation refused to list.
SASB Metals & Mining Standard https://sasb.ifrs.org/standards/download The metrics require the accounting of incidents against community rights — a field intentionally suppressed across all annual sustainability report disclosures.
Questions for Investigation
  • Which management body assumed final responsibility for approving a GRI Content Index knowingly purged of the worst ongoing Brazilian controversy?
  • Were there explicit discussions with the independent verification and assurance firm regarding the silencing of this liability in the social balance sheets?
  • Were investors with sustainable mandates retroactively informed once investigative outlets identified the omission fraud in the reports?
  • Does competitive sector analysis reveal whether peer mining companies in the region centralize disclosure with greater or lesser informational integrity?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 20 – CDC Art. 37 / Greenwashing – Misleading advertising by omission

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Brazil's Consumer Protection Code (Art. 37) prohibits and severely penalizes misleading advertising conveyed by omission — that is, withholding from audiences facts of the highest relevance. This same framework is reinforced by the European regulatory architecture against the manipulation of ecological claims (Green Claims Directive), which censures aggressive corporate ESG campaigns that construct unrealistic ethical facades in order to mask extreme controversies.
WHAT CMOC DID
Leveraging its colossal media reach, CMOC flooded its social networks with laudatory communications enumerating the 17 ESG awards recently earned for the benefit of its 175,000 global followers. Yet in a classic move of structural greenwashing, it buried the latent social tragedy in absolute secrecy — digitally sweeping under the rug the entrenched destitution, the 6 recorded fatalities, and the legal predicaments surrounding the expropriation of the Boa Vista Mine.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE – PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
CMOC Official Media Wall (X/Twitter) https://x.com/cmoc_group A timeline saturated with sustainability accolades yet entirely shielded from any allusion to the conflicts or adverse rulings issued by the Goiás courts.
Official Facebook Page – CMOC Brasil https://facebook.com/cmocbrasil Local "Cerrado Imaterial" celebration posts clash with the moral failure demonstrated by the informational blackout surrounding the deaths of elderly landowners on the mine's borders.
Corporate Institutional Portals https://en.cmoc.com / https://cmocbrasil.com The structural machinery of the platforms oriented toward reputational glorification, built upon the intentional and coordinated exclusion of contentious grievances.
Complaints Channel – National Consumer Secretariat (Senacon/DPDC) https://www.justica.gov.br/seus-direitos/consumidor The legally established Brazilian instruments for receiving inquiries based on the spurious tactics of omissive propaganda employed by large corporations.
Questions for Investigation
  • Did the Asian parent's Marketing Committee conduct a risk analysis of the punitive exposure inherent in classifying corporate posts as greenwashing?
  • Have the Public Prosecutor's Office or European antitrust bodies received formal complaints against the distorted advertising disseminated internationally?
  • Who directed and approved the editorial content of ESG campaigns in Brazil, ensuring deathly silence regarding the legal siege imposed on the company?
  • How do certifying bodies justify maintaining their seals in the face of blatant evidence of the systemic promotional distortion practiced by the brand?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence

Violation 21 – Certification contracts (ISO / RMAP / FTSE4Good / MSCI) – Failure to notify of a material event

WHAT THE STANDARD REQUIRES
Under fundamental contractual force, the ties formed between issuers and independent verification agencies (such as ISO bodies and MSCI/FTSE index administrators) presuppose informational good faith. It is mandatory that companies submit prompt notification to certifying bodies regarding any drastic material change in the legal landscape that may breach the boundaries of the certified scope or threaten the lands registered to the operation.
WHAT CMOC DID
In blatant contradiction of the requirements of commercial good faith, not a single trace exists indicating that CMOC's board communicated the alarming ruling issued by the TJ-GO on 19/03/2025 to the RMAP, MSCI, FTSE, or local ISO liaison committees. The mine's validating seals and untouched ratings survived more than a year entirely shielded from the abrupt escalation of real litigation threats.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE – PROOF OF VIOLATION
Document Location What it proves
RMI / RMAP Compliance Portals and Records https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org
https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/facilities-lists/public-list/
The stagnant audit compliance status confirms that the certifying body never initiated an extraordinary review triggered by alerts received from the company.
FTSE Russell Index Action Criteria https://www.lseg.com/en/ftse-russell/indices/ftse4good Eligibility monitoring confirms that the litigation incident was excluded from the portfolio inclusion decision, ratifying the presumption of retention.
Institutional Assessment Platform – MSCI ESG Ratings https://www.msci.com/data-and-analytics/sustainability-solutions/esg-ratings-climate-search-tool CMOC's published metrics show that algorithmic red flags remained dormant, signaling a glaring failure in contractual communication flows.
National Certifying Body Registry – INMETRO https://www.inmetro.gov.br/organismos Accreditation records confirm that timely reviews triggered by high-level risk events did not feature in the corrective expert roadmap adopted.
Questions for Investigation
  • Did CMOC's secretary-general issue at least one confidential extrajudicial communication, or did the company deliberately neglect mandatory notification obligations?
  • Were there any board-level meetings that weighed the criminal consequences of a sudden cancellation of environmental certifications?
  • How will the bodies that maintain these indices absorb the public disclosure of the fact that their seals were manipulated through unilateral procedural withholding?
  • Did major global funds receive circular alerts warning of the dangerous stability asymmetry posed by the collapse of the validating shields?
Violation confirmed — direct documentary evidence
Independent Investigation
PART V — THE PARADOX AND THE CYCLE THAT SUSTAINS IT
How the violations have mutually sustained one another for 10 years – Integrated Normative Framework

THE CENTRAL QUESTION

How can a company simultaneously hold 17 active ESG recognitions — including assessments rating its risk management as "strong" — while extracting USD 3.5 billion over 10 years from land claimed by a family in which:
  • 6 co-owners died without any compensation;
  • 1 co-owner, aged 81, blind, survives on US$180/month;
  • The mandatory regulatory channel has remained silent for 414 days regarding the judicial ruling that crystallized this risk;
  • IAS 37 provision recognized over 10 fiscal years: R$0.00;
  • Compensation paid to the family: US$0.00.

The answer is not an isolated governance failure. The answer is a mechanism: the financial, accounting, and capital markets violations, and the humanitarian violations, are not parallel — they produce one another, in a closed cycle, sustained for 10 consecutive years. Compliance with any obligation in one sphere would have made non-compliance in the other impossible.

THE MECHANISM — A FOUR-NODE CYCLE

The cycle operates in a single direction — Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 1 — and is self-sustaining. The output of each node is the entry condition of the next. Any single point can, in isolation, break it.

▶ N 1 — THE ACTIVE LEGAL RISK NEVER ENTERS THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The 17 active ESG certifications and 10 clean Deloitte opinions maintain the company's public and regulatory representation intact. No certifying body has issued any statement following the TJ-GO ruling of 19/03/2025. No auditor has recorded a qualification, caveat, or flag in any fiscal year.

This node is sustained because the company exercises complete control over the flow of information feeding the assessment processes. By failing to register the litigation in the quality management system (Violation 1), by failing to conduct documented due diligence (Violation 11), by failing to notify certifying bodies of the TJ-GO ruling (Violation 21), and by failing to conduct impairment tests that would generate signals for auditors (Violation 5), CMOC ensures that Node 1 never receives sufficient adverse information to trigger a corrective response.

Active violations: Violation 1 (ISO 9001 — absence of legal risk management), Violation 5 (IAS 36/IFRS 3 — zero impairment tests), Violation 11 (due diligence not conducted), Violation 21 (certifiers not notified of the TJ-GO ruling)
If the risk does not exist in the management system, the certifying bodies' auditors have no trigger to audit it.

▶ N 2 — CERTIFIERS RECEIVE NO INFORMATION — AND RENEW AUTOMATICALLY

The burden-of-proof reversal of 19/03/2025 does not appear on HKExNews (code 03993), in Note XIII of the AR 2025, in public RMI documents, in the ESG Report 2024, or in any corporate communication directed at the company's 175,000 aggregate followers.

The invisibility is not accidental — it is structural. The legal deadline under HKEX Rule 13.09 is 2 hours for publication of inside information (Violation 3). The TJ-GO event was also a mandatory subsequent event under IAS 10 (Violation 4), a mandatory matter under KPI B8 of the HKEX ESG Reporting Guide (Violation 8), and a direct violation of the obligation to communicate community impacts that underpins the ESG certifications held (Violation 20). In 414 days, none of these channels received any information.

Active violations: Violation 3 (HKEX Rule 13.09 — 414 days of silence in the regulatory channel), Violation 4 (IAS 10 — subsequent event not disclosed in AR 2025), Violation 8 (HKEX ESG Guide B8 — 10 years without community impact reporting), Violation 20 (HRIA absent / structural greenwashing to 175,000 followers)
With the ESG shield intact and zero qualifications in audit opinions, the liability remains with no recognized accounting cost.

▶ N 3 — LIABILITY WITHOUT ACCOUNTING COST — DIRECTORS WITHOUT FINANCIAL PRESSURE

Without recognized IAS 37 provisions (Violation 2), without regulatory disclosure (Violation 3), without rating downgrades, without index inclusion reviews, without auditor qualifications, and without going concern assessments (Violation 7), the nominal accumulated cost of omission remains at zero in the accounting records. The internal arithmetic of the decision between remediation and continuation does not change.

The maximum liability under Art. 1,216 of the Civil Code — USD 3.5 billion, equivalent to 119% of group profit in 2025 — does not exist in the balance sheets. The RMB 183 million recorded as a litigation guarantee for Brazilian litigation does not include the Duarte litigation, classified as carrying a "low" probability of loss in Note XIII of the AR 2025, 373 days after the burden-of-proof reversal. The directors who signed each financial statement have not been held accountable (Violation 9). The CMOC Brasil → IXM Geneva transaction continues without disclosed transfer pricing (Violation 6).

Active violations: Violation 2 (IAS 37 — R$0 provision over 10 fiscal years), Violation 6 (IAS 24/Transfer Pricing — CMOC Brasil → IXM opacity), Violation 7 (IAS 1 — going concern for Brazilian CGU not assessed), Violation 9 (HK Companies Ordinance — fiduciary duty of directors not triggered)
Without a registered cost, there is no operational pressure to resolve, compensate, or even acknowledge the human impact.

N 4 — THE HUMAN IMPACT REMAINS INVISIBLE IN CHANNELS WITH ENFORCEMENT POWER

The Duarte Family was never identified as a formal stakeholder. The only grievance channel made available by CMOC is a digital form — inaccessible to an 81-year-old litigant who is blind and illiterate (violation of UNGPs Principle 31, CRPD Arts. 12 and 13). No Human Rights Impact Assessment has been published in 10 years. The 6 deaths of co-owners during the litigation appear in no ESG report, annual report, or HKExNews release. The end buyers of the niobium — Airbus, BMW, GE Aviation, among others — conduct their due diligence based on the RMAP certifications and MSCI ratings that depend precisely on the information that Node 1 omitted.

Active violations: Violation 10 (Duarte Family not identified as stakeholder), Violation 12 (grievance mechanism inaccessible — UNGPs Principle 31), Violation 13 (CRPD Arts. 12 and 13), Violation 16 (zero remediation in 10 years), Violation 17 (LkSG/CSDDD — 5 triggers activated, buyers without documented specific due diligence)
Since no external actor receives the complete data, there is no external pressure for the risk to enter the management system — and the cycle restarts at Node 1.

"The cycle does not depend on bad faith at each step. It depends on every actor operating within their own limits — and on no one crossing those limits to verify the full picture."

THE ARITHMETIC PARADOX — PAIRS OF SIMULTANEOUS COEXISTENCE

All values below are drawn exclusively from audited primary sources, CMOC's own official sources, and litigation documents. Each pair represents two simultaneously true facts about the same company, during the same period, over the same land.

WHAT CMOC DEMONSTRATES THE DOCUMENTED REALITY OBLIGATION VIOLATED
USD 3.5 billion Estimated cumulative revenue, Boa Vista Mine 2016–2025 US$0.00 Compensation paid to the Duarte Family over 10 years Violation 15 (UDHR/Pact of San José)
Violation 16 (UNGPs 13/22)
Violation 18 (IFC PS5)
RMB 20.3 billion CMOC Group profit in 2025 (AR 2025, Deloitte) R$0.00 IAS 37 provision over 10 fiscal years for the Duarte litigation Violation 2 (IAS 37 §14 and §86)
Art. 1,216 CCB as quantification basis
21,000+ Declared direct beneficiaries of CMOC Brasil's social investment 2024–2025 0 Beneficiaries from the Duarte Family in the same period Violation 10 (ISO 14001/45001)
Violation 16 (UNGPs 22)
Violation 8 (HKEX KPI B8)
11,000+ students Benefited by the Cerrado Imaterial project, awarded for 'community relations' 6 deaths Co-owners of the same land, deceased without remediation Violation 14 (Elderly Persons Statute)
Violation 16 (UNGPs 13/22)
Violation 20 (Greenwashing)
175,000 followers Aggregate audience exposed to corporate ESG communications 0 mentions Of the Duarte litigation, the 6 deaths, or the TJ-GO ruling in any official channel Violation 8 (HKEX ESG Guide B8)
Violation 20 (CDC Art. 37 / UNGPs 15(c))
2 hours Legal deadline under HKEX Rule 13.09(1)(a) for disclosure of inside information 414 days Effective silence on HKExNews following the TJ-GO ruling of 19/03/2025 Violation 3 (HKEX Rule 13.09)
Violation 4 (IAS 10)
10 consecutive fiscal years With clean Deloitte opinions, without qualifications 0 tests Publicly documented impairment tests for the Brazilian CGU in the same period Violation 5 (IAS 36/IFRS 3)
Violation 1 (ISO 9001 — risk not registered)
RMB 183 million Litigation guarantee for Brazilian litigation (+74% p.a.) "low" Probability of loss in the Duarte litigation — Note XIII, 373 days after burden-of-proof reversal Violation 2 (IAS 37)
Violation 4 (IAS 10)
Violation 9 (Fiduciary duty)
0.08% of profit Share allocated to Brazilian social investment 2024–2025 119% of profit Share corresponding to the maximum liability under Art. 1,216 CCB, not provisioned Violation 2 (IAS 37)
Violation 7 (IAS 1 — going concern)
17 ESG recognitions Ratings, indices, certifications, and awards currently active 0 HRIAs Human rights impact assessments for Catalão-Ouvidor published in 10 years Violation 20 (UNGPs 18 — HRIA)
Violation 11 (FTSE4Good/RMAP)
Violation 21 (Certifiers)
86,548 tonnes Niobium produced at the Boa Vista Mine through Q1 2026 0 proposals Of humanitarian negotiation registered in the case record over 10 years Violation 16 (UNGPs 22 / CSDDD Art. 9)
Violation 17 (LkSG/CSDDD — 5 triggers)

WHY THE CYCLE PERSISTS — FOUR COEXISTING MECHANISMS

Each mechanism below explains a different dimension of the cycle's persistence. All four operate simultaneously and reinforce one another. The absence of any single one would be sufficient to render the cycle unstable.

Mechanism 1 — Concession under incomplete information (self-reporting bias)

Certifying bodies operate predominantly under a self-reporting standard: the data assessed is provided by the company itself. CMOC did not submit to the ESG assessment process data that it also omitted from the mandatory securities regulatory process. Node 1 is sustained because Node 2 controls the information input into Node 1. Certifiers approved CMOC in every fiscal year based on information that systematically excludes the Duarte litigation — the same exclusion that constitutes a violation of Rule 13.09 before the HKEX. The same omission serves two functions: it preserves the rating and avoids the announcement.

Violations sustained: Violations 1, 3, 11 and 21
Node fed: Node 1 Node 2 (invisibility feeds certification, and certification legitimizes invisibility)

Mechanism 2 — Methodological insufficiency of certifications

Current methodologies are not structurally capable of capturing human impacts identifiable outside the scope of direct employees and first-tier suppliers — even when those impacts are public, materially significant, and documented in verifiable primary sources (TJ-GO judicial rulings, DPU statements, CPT Goiás, MPGO, coverage in Diálogo Chino, dialogue.earth, and regional press). MSCI maintained an AA rating for three consecutive fiscal years without the Duarte case featuring as a controversy. S&P approved the MSA for three consecutive years. RMAP certified the Boa Vista Mine with an active litigation over the very land being audited. Certifications cease to serve as guarantees of conduct and become indicators of adherence to a limited reporting standard.

Violations sustained: Violations 11, 20 and 21 (the certifications whose methodology cannot capture the case sustain the violations the case evidences)
Node fed: Node 1 (methodological insufficiency is what allows Node 1 to renew itself every fiscal year)

Mechanism 3 — Systematic selective communication

CMOC practices structurally dual communication: conspicuous regarding awards, certifications, and ratings across voluntary channels (LinkedIn, Instagram, X, corporate website — 175,000 followers); silent regarding the price-sensitive event of 19/03/2025 in the mandatory regulatory channel (HKExNews — 0 announcements in 414 days). This dual operation is not incidental: it is the legal type of misleading advertising by omission under CDC Art. 37, the direct object of the EU Green Claims Directive, and the specific violation of UNGPs Principle 15(c). It serves the function of keeping the ESG reputation intact for the 175,000 followers while the mandatory channel — the only one with real enforcement capacity — remains silenced.

Violations sustained: Violations 3, 8 and 20 (the three communication obligations — regulatory, periodic, and community impact — are violated in a coordinated manner)
Node fed: Node 2 (selective communication is the mechanism that keeps the case invisible in formal channels)

Mechanism 4 — Systemic failure of independent verification

The facts of this case are public, verifiable, and available in primary sources accessible for over a decade. The global ESG verification system — certifiers, auditors, securities regulators, industrial buyers, institutional investors — fails to capture and address the information because each actor operates within its own methodological and jurisdictional limits. The HKEX verifies securities disclosure, not humanitarian impact. ISO verifies the management system, not the operational outcome for communities. Deloitte audits the accounting conformity of recognized provisions, not the adequacy of unrecognized provisions. RMAP audits the due diligence process, not the actual extent of impacts. No actor holds a mandate over the entire case. The entire case falls through the gaps — and the global buyers of niobium (Airbus, BMW, GE Aviation, among others) who bear autonomous obligations under LkSG and CSDDD have yet to document any specific due diligence regarding the Boa Vista Mine.

Violations sustained: Violations 5, 11, 17, 19 and 21 (each violation survives because no external verifier holds an integral mandate over it)
Node fed: Node 3 and Node 4 (the absence of integrated verification is what allows financial and humanitarian costs to accumulate without consequence)

OPERATIONAL POINTS FOR BREAKING THE CYCLE

Each of the four points below is individually sufficient to break the cycle. None requires a new fact — all facts are documented and available. What each point requires is compliance with obligations already active and overdue.

(a) Review by certifying bodies — Breaking Node 1

Review by certifying bodies of the case facts based on verifiable public primary sources: the TJ-GO ruling of 19/03/2025, court records available via public search, DPU statements, medical reports filed with the proceedings, death certificates of the 6 co-owners, and verified journalistic coverage. Possible outcomes of the review include: downgrade of MSCI AA through activation of Controversy Categories (Category 4–5); suspension or removal of FTSE4Good inclusion for non-compliance with the Human Rights & Community dimension; suspension of the Boa Vista Mine's RMAP certification for violation of the audited scope; and ISO opinion qualifications for non-conformity with Clauses 4.1 and 4.2.

Obligations fulfilled: Violation 21 (certifier notification), Violation 11 (due diligence), Violation 1 (ISO 9001 risk management)
Node interrupted: Node 1 — automatic certification renewal is halted

(b) Formal regulatory disclosure — Breaking Node 2

Publication of a formal announcement on HKExNews regarding the burden-of-proof reversal (TJ-GO ruling, 19/03/2025) and regarding the existence and evolution of TJGO litigation no. . Deadline under Rule 13.09: 2 hours. The announcement would simultaneously constitute the belated compliance with Rule 13.09 (Violation 3), the acknowledgment of the subsequent event under IAS 10 (Violation 4), and the trigger for review by rating agencies that operate on company-supplied data. Additionally, inclusion of the case under KPI B8 in the next annual report (Violation 8).

Obligations fulfilled: Violation 3 (HKEX Rule 13.09), Violation 4 (IAS 10), Violation 8 (HKEX ESG Guide B8)
Node interrupted: Node 2 — the case becomes visible in formal channels; market mechanisms are activated

(c) IAS 37 provision and accounting recognition — Breaking Node 3

Recognition of a provision for material contingency in the financial statements — the amount to be determined between the median scenario (USD 240–360 million) and the maximum (USD 3.5 billion, quantified under Art. 1,216 CCB) — with reopening of the Deloitte opinion for fiscal year 2025 or inscription in the next interim financial statements. Accounting recognition transforms the liability from invisible to measurable, compels a review of the Deloitte rating, mandatorily triggers the going concern assessment (Violation 7), and exposes the period of omission to analysis of fiduciary liability of signatory directors (Violation 9). The impairment test for the Brazilian CGU (Violation 5) becomes unavoidable.

Obligations fulfilled: Violation 2 (IAS 37), Violation 5 (IAS 36/IFRS 3), Violation 7 (IAS 1), Violation 9 (HK Companies Ordinance Cap. 622)
Node interrupted: Node 3 — the absence of financial cost is eliminated; the internal arithmetic of omission is reversed

(d) Effective remediation to the Duarte Family — Breaking Node 4

Fulfillment of humanitarian obligations under the seven criteria of UNGPs Principle 31: (1) formal identification of the Duarte Family as a stakeholder (Violation 10); (2) provision of an accessible and effective grievance mechanism, with reasonable accommodations for Glória Duarte as a person with disabilities (Violations 12 and 13); (3) development of a livelihood restoration plan (Violation 18); (4) documented remediation measures communicated publicly (Violation 16); (5) a compensation proposal for proceeds harvested since the extrajudicial notification of 30/03/2015 (Violation 15). Effective remediation is the only point that simultaneously fulfills obligations in both spheres: by documenting and disclosing the remediation process, the company necessarily also fulfills Violations 3, 8 and 20.

Obligations fulfilled: Violations 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18 — and consequently Violations 3, 8 and 20
Node interrupted: Node 4 — the humanitarian violation is ended; the return to Node 1 that sustains the cycle is eliminated

THE 17 ACTIVE ESG RECOGNITIONS — INVENTORY AND DIRECT CONTRADICTION

Each of the 17 active recognitions was granted based on information provided by the company itself. None processed the verifiable facts of the Duarte litigation within its assessment methodology. The table below maps each recognition against the specific violation it implicitly certifies as non-existent.

# RECOGNITION WHAT IT CERTIFIES (IMPLICITLY) DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED VIOLATION
1 MSCI ESG Rating — AA (3 consecutive fiscal years) Risk management rated "strong"; zero active controversies in Human Rights & Community Violation 11, Violation 20, Violation 21 (Category 4–5 not triggered)
2 S&P Global — Metals Sustainability Assessment (MSA) (3 consecutive years) Adequate supply chain due diligence; community impacts managed Violation 11, Violation 17, Violation 20
3 RMAP — Chain of Custody Certification, Boa Vista Mine (active) Complete due diligence over the audited area; absence of active land conflicts Violation 11, Violation 12, Violation 16 (Active litigation over the very land being audited)
4 FTSE4Good — Index inclusion (active) Conformity with Human Rights & Community; effective grievance mechanisms in place Violations 10, 12, 13, 16, 20
5 ISO 9001 — Quality Management System Certification Material legal risks registered and managed in the QMS Violation 1 — Duarte litigation not registered in the management system
6 ISO 14001 — Environmental Management System Certification Stakeholders with environmental impacts identified and considered Violation 10 — Duarte Family not identified as a stakeholder
7 ISO 45001 — Occupational Health and Safety Certification Surrounding communities identified within the scope of relevant risks Violations 10, 14 — impacts on elderly population ignored
8 Deloitte — Clean Opinion (10 consecutive fiscal years 2016–2025) Adequate provisions for material contingencies; financial statements free of material misstatements Violation 2 — R$0.00 IAS 37 provision
Violation 5 — zero impairment tests
9 HKEX ESG Report — Annual publication (10 reports issued) KPI B8 fulfilled; community impacts reported; engagement with affected parties documented Violation 8 — 10 years without reporting the Duarte case
10 'Community Relations' Award — Cerrado Imaterial Project (11,000+ students benefited, awarded) Exemplary company in community relations in its area of operation (Catalão-Ouvidor) Violations 16, 20 — 6 deaths in the same region without remediation
11 Declared Social Investment 2024–2025 (21,000+ direct beneficiaries) Robust and comprehensive social responsibility in impact communities Violations 10, 15 — Duarte Family: 0 beneficiaries in the same period
12 CMOC Group Sustainability Report (published annually) Comprehensive voluntary disclosure of ESG impacts; conformity with GRI Standards Violation 20 — Duarte litigation absent from all reports; structural greenwashing
13 UNGPs / Human Rights Policy Compliance Declaration Human rights policy implemented; human rights due diligence conducted Violation 11 — no HRIA published
Violation 16 — zero documented remediation
14 Conflict Minerals / Dodd-Frank / OECD Due Diligence Guidance Compliance Minerals free of active land conflicts in the supply chain Violation 17 — 5 LkSG/CSDDD triggers present; buyers not notified
15 Inclusion in Chinese stock exchange ESG indices (SSE/SZSE) Conformity with ESG standards applicable to Chinese issuers listed in Hong Kong Violations 3, 7, 9 — securities disclosure and going concern obligations not met
16 Recognition for Innovation in Corporate Governance Practices (AR 2025, governance section) Internal control and governance mechanisms functioning properly Violations 1, 9 — material legal risk not registered; directors not held accountable
17 ESG Communications to 175,000 aggregate followers (LinkedIn, Instagram, X, corporate website) Proactive stakeholder transparency; verifiable and consistent ESG reputation Violations 3, 20 — 0 mentions of the Duarte litigation or TJ-GO ruling in 414 days

THE 21 OBLIGATIONS VIOLATED — INTEGRATED MAP

The 21 violations are distributed across two structurally interdependent spheres: the first — 9 financial, accounting, and governance violations; the second — 12 humanitarian and corporate responsibility violations. The map below identifies for each violation the applicable standard, a precise description of the breach, and the node(s) of the cycle it feeds.

FINANCIAL, ACCOUNTING AND CAPITAL MARKETS VIOLATIONS (9 violations)
VIOLATION STANDARD DESCRIPTION OF BREACH NODES
Violation 1 ISO 9001 Clauses 4.1 and 6.1 Duarte litigation (TJGO No. ) not registered in the legal risk management system. The TJ-GO ruling of 19/03/2025 did not trigger a risk register update. Absence of internal trigger for provision or disclosure. Node 1
Node 2
Violation 2 IAS 37 §14, §86
CPC 25
R$0.00 provision for material contingency over 10 consecutive fiscal years (2016–2025). Litigation classified as carrying a "low" probability of loss in Note XIII of the AR 2025 — 373 days after the burden-of-proof reversal. Divergence between RMB 183 million (litigation guarantee) and maximum exposure under Art. 1,216 CCB. Node 3
Violation 3 HKEX Main Board Rule 13.09(1)(a) 414 days of silence in the mandatory regulatory channel (HKExNews — code 03993) following the TJ-GO ruling of 19/03/2025. Legal deadline: 2 hours. The burden-of-proof reversal constitutes inside information with a direct impact on liability valuation. Node 2
Violation 4 IAS 10
CPC 24
Subsequent event (TJ-GO ruling, 19/03/2025) not disclosed in the Annual Report 2025 published after the ruling. Note XIII classifies the litigation as carrying a "low" probability without reflecting the material evidentiary change. Node 2
Node 3
Violation 5 IAS 36 / IFRS 3
CPC 01
Zero publicly documented impairment tests for the Brazilian CGU over 10 fiscal years. The active litigation over the land on which the Boa Vista Mine operates constitutes an external indicator of impairment mandatorily assessable under IAS 36 §12. Node 1
Node 3
Violation 6 IAS 24 / OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines CMOC Brasil → IXM Geneva transaction (100% of niobium produced) without disclosed transfer pricing. Opacity over revenue effectively recognized in Brazil vs. margin captured in Geneva. Relevant to the quantification of Art. 1,216 CCB. Node 3
Violation 7 IAS 1 §25
CPC 26 — Going Concern
Maximum exposure under Art. 1,216 CCB (USD 3.5 billion = 119% of group profit in 2025) not assessed in the going concern context of the Brazilian CGU. No materiality analysis conducted for Brazilian operations in the context of the contingent liability. Node 3
Violation 8 HKEX ESG Reporting Guide — KPI B8 10 annual ESG reports issued without any reference to the Duarte litigation, the 6 deaths of co-owners, the TJ-GO ruling, or any impact on the Duarte Family. KPI B8 (community impacts) not fulfilled in any fiscal year. Node 2
Violation 9 HK Companies Ordinance Cap. 622 §§ 213, 214, 465 Directors who signed the financial statements 2016–2025 have not been held accountable for classifying the Duarte litigation as "low" probability despite the burden-of-proof reversal. Fiduciary duty of due care and diligence not exercised in relation to the omitted material liability. Node 3
HUMANITARIAN VIOLATIONS (12 violations)
VIOLATION STANDARD DESCRIPTION OF BREACH NODES
Violation 10 ISO 14001 §4.2
ISO 45001 §4.2
Duarte Family not formally identified as a stakeholder in the environmental and OHS management system in any of the 10 fiscal years — despite active litigation over the operation's land. ISO conformity audits did not capture the omission. Node 4
Violation 11 FTSE4Good Human Rights
RMAP Scope 1 §3.2
OECD Due Diligence
No Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) conducted or published for Catalão-Ouvidor in 10 years. Specific due diligence on the Duarte litigation not documented. Certifications granted without independent verification of impacts on the family. Node 1
Node 4
Violation 12 FTSE4Good — Grievance Mechanism Criteria
UNGPs Principle 31
No grievance mechanism made available to the Duarte Family in an accessible format over the 10 years of litigation. Court proceedings do not substitute the operational corporate mechanism required by the UNGPs. FTSE4Good criterion not met. Node 4
Violation 13 CRPD Art. 13
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Glória Duarte (81 years old, blind, illiterate) did not receive reasonable accommodations to participate in engagement, notification, or grievance processes. Informational accessibility barriers were not removed at any point during the litigation. Node 4
Violation 14 Elderly Persons Statute Arts. 96 and 97 (Law 10,741/2003) Glória Duarte (81 years old) subjected to conditions of material vulnerability directly linked to CMOC's failure to provide compensation. Arts. 96–97 provide for criminal dimensions in cases of abandonment and exposure of an elderly person to a situation of risk. No corporate response to the specific obligations under the Elderly Persons Statute. Node 4
Violation 15 UDHR Art. 17
Pact of San José Art. 21
Art. 1,216 CCB
Duarte Family's property rights over the land on which the Boa Vista Mine operates ignored for 10 years. Compensation for proceeds harvested since the extrajudicial notification of 30/03/2015 not paid: US$0.00. Accumulation of an estimated USD 3.5 billion in revenue over claimed land. Node 4
Violation 16 UNGPs Principles 13 and 22
CSDDD Art. 9
OECD Chapter IV
Zero documented remediation measures in the case record over 10 years of litigation. Zero humanitarian negotiation proposals on file. The obligation to remediate human rights impacts caused or contributed to by the company is unconditional under the UNGPs — independent of the judicial outcome. Node 4
Violation 17 LkSG (Germany)
CSDDD (EU 2024/1760)
OECD MNE Guidelines
Five mandatory due diligence triggers simultaneously present: (1) active land litigation; (2) deaths of claimants; (3) extreme vulnerability of the principal litigant; (4) absence of compensation; (5) adverse judicial ruling. Industrial buyers (Airbus, BMW, GE Aviation, and others) without documented specific due diligence regarding the Boa Vista Mine. Node 4
Violation 18 IFC Performance Standard 5 §§ 6–10 Zero livelihood restoration plan developed for the Duarte Family in 10 years. IFC PS5 requires a plan even when the displacement is not physically forced by the company, but results from conditions created by the operation. Glória Duarte's current income (US$180/month) contrasts sharply with the revenue generated by operations over her land. Node 4
Violation 19 UNGPs Principle 21
GRI 411 / GRI 413
No externally verifiable report (GRI, CDP, UNGC CoP) describes the situation of the Duarte Family as a real operational impact. Absence of independent verification of ESG commitment compliance at the specific Boa Vista Mine. Node 1
Node 4
Violation 20 UNGPs Principle 15(c)
CDC Art. 37
EU Green Claims Directive
Systemic selective ESG communication: 17 recognitions promoted across voluntary channels (175,000 followers); TJ-GO ruling and 6 deaths absent from all channels. Constitutes misleading advertising by omission (CDC Art. 37), operational greenwashing (UNGPs 15(c)), and anticipatory violation of the EU Green Claims Directive. Node 2
Node 4
Violation 21 ISO 14001 §9.3
FTSE4Good Review Process
RMAP Procedural Requirements
Certifying bodies (MSCI, S&P, RMAP, FTSE4Good, ISO) were not notified of the TJ-GO ruling of 19/03/2025. Obligation to communicate material changes to the certified management system not fulfilled. Every certification renewal after 19/03/2025 has occurred with incomplete information. Node 1

FINAL EQUATION — WHAT 17 PLUS 21 PRODUCES

The coexistence of 17 active ESG recognitions with 21 simultaneous violations is not a statistical accident. It is the measurable result of a four-node cycle operating without interruption for 10 years. The equation below describes the causal relationship:

17 ACTIVE ESG RECOGNITIONS
+
21 VERIFIABLE VIOLATIONS
=
10 YEARS OF CYCLE
THE FINAL NUMBERS — MEASURABLE AND VERIFIABLE
  • USD 3.5 BILLION extracted over 10 years from claimed land
  • US$0.00 paid to the family in 10 years
  • 6 DEATHS of co-owners without remediation
  • 2 HOURS Rule 13.09 deadline ignored for 414 days
  • R$0.00 IAS 37 provision over 10 fiscal years
  • 0 HRIAs in 10 years of certified operation

CONCLUSION — THE ARCHITECTURE OF VIOLATION

The paradox has a structure: 17 ESG certifications, 21 violations coexisting with 6 deaths, zero compensation, and no remediation in 10 years of litigation.

It is the foreseeable consequence of a cycle in which the obligation to register risk was never fulfilled, which made it possible not to disclose it, which eliminated the financial cost of omission, which allowed extraction to continue, which kept the humanitarian impact invisible, which enabled the renewal of certifications.

The cycle has lasted 10 years. It has 21 obligations simultaneously violated. It has identifiable victims with names, ages, medical reports, and death certificates filed in the case record for each of the 6 deaths. It has the survivor, Glória Duarte. It has verifiable primary sources for every claim.

What the cycle does not have is a point of irreversibility: any one of the four operational points above is sufficient to break it. The Rule 13.09 deadline is 2 hours. The silence is being counted every day.

9 Profiles Impacted by the 21 Violations

How the 21 violations committed by CMOC Group Limited impact 9 profiles reached by niobium extraction.

Full Matrix · 9 Site Profiles × 21 Violations Accounting · Humanitarian · ESG
P1
Shareholders / Investors / Fund Managers
Fiduciary duty + Material misstatement — ESG downgrade · Cathay Fortune · BlackRock · Vanguard · MSCI Index
7 violations
V2R$0 in provisions across 10 fiscal years — concealed liability of up to US$3.5 billionIAS 37 §14
V3414 days of silence following the TJ-GO ruling — inside information not disclosedHKEX Rule 13.09
V4Reversal of the burden of proof (19 Mar 2025) not reported as a subsequent eventIAS 10
V5Zero impairment tests on the Brazil CGU — goodwill of US$900M–1.2B untestedIAS 36 / IFRS 3
V7Going concern of the Brazil CGU not assessed under an active 10-year litigationIAS 1
V9Directors' fiduciary duty not invoked — breach of dutyHK Companies Ord.
V21ESG certifiers not notified — AA/AAA ratings maintained on incomplete dataRMI / MSCI / FTSE / ISO
P2
Independent Auditors
Audit failure — professional liability · Deloitte · PCAOB · AFRC · ICAS · Big Four
6 violations
V1Active legal risk not registered in the QMS — ISO 9001 violated by the audited CMOC entity itselfISO 9001
V2R$0 in provisions across 10 fiscal years — Deloitte issued a clean opinion without qualificationIAS 37 §14
V4TJ-GO subsequent event not identified as a KAM — ISA 260/701 omittedIAS 10 / ISA 260
V5Zero impairment tested on the Brazil CGU — ISA 540 (accounting estimates) not complied withIAS 36 / ISA 540
V7Going concern not assessed — ISA 570 potentially violated in the 27 Mar 2026 audit opinionIAS 1 / ISA 570
V9Directors' fiduciary duty not flagged — ISA 501 (Litigation) not complied withHK Companies Ord. / ISA 501
P3
Market Regulators
Disclosure violation — market integrity · HKEX · SFC · CVM · IOSCO · ESMA · SEC
6 violations
V2R$0 in provisions — material misstatement in financial statements filed with HKEXIAS 37 §14
V3414 days of regulatory silence — Listing Rule 13.09 violated (statutory deadline: 2 hours)HKEX Rule 13.09
V4Reversal of the burden of proof (19 Mar 2025) not reported to HKExNews in any announcementIAS 10
V6Intra-group transfer price CMOC→IXM Geneva not disclosed — CFEM royalty base potentially understatedIAS 24 / Transfer Pricing
V810 years without community impact reporting in the Boa Vista Mine areaHKEX ESG KPI B8
V9Directors' fiduciary duty — SFC / AFRC have enforcement mandateHK Companies Ord.
P4
ESG Certification Bodies
Systemic greenwashing — sector credibility · MSCI · FTSE Russell · S&P · Sustainalytics · Wind China · NOSA
6 violations
V1Active legal risk not registered in the QMS — ISO 9001 issued to a mining company with 10-year active litigationISO 9001
V810 years without community impact reporting — HKEX ESG Framework KPI B8 omittedHKEX ESG KPI B8
V11HRIA absent — criterion required by FTSE4Good and RMAP (RMI) never published for BrazilFTSE4Good / RMAP / UNGPs
V19Community impacts omitted from ESG reports — the Duarte family invisible in rating dataGRI 413 / SASB M&M
V20Structural greenwashing — AA/AAA ratings coexisting with 6 deaths, zero compensation, 10 years of litigationUNGPs 15(c) / CDC Art. 37
V21Certifiers not notified 414+ days after the TJ-GO ruling — rating data out of dateRMI / MSCI / FTSE / ISO
P5
Supply Chain Customers
LkSG/CSDDD — Blood Niobium in the final product · Airbus · BMW · Mercedes · VW · GE Aviation · Tesla · BAFA
6 violations
V11Human rights due diligence not conducted / HRIA absent — active obligation following notificationFTSE4Good / RMAP / UNGPs
V16Zero remediation in 10 years — Blood Niobium enters the supply chain without compensation to the victimUNGPs 13/22 / CSDDD Art. 9
V17All 5 LkSG/CSDDD triggers activated — German and European buyers bear co-responsibilityLkSG / CSDDD
V18Zero livelihood restoration plan — IFC PS5 requirement for certified suppliersIFC PS5
V20CMOC certifications used as a due diligence shield by buyers constitute greenwashingUNGPs 15(c) / CDC Art. 37
V21RMI Certified — the due diligence basis for Boeing/Airbus/BMW — with incomplete data for 414+ daysRMI / MSCI / FTSE / ISO
P6
Government of Brazil
Simultaneously victim and complicit — fiscal sovereignty, elderly persons, environment · Receita Federal · ANM · MPF · DPU · SEMAD · Itamaraty
6 violations
V6CFEM royalty understated by ~R$344M — CMOC→IXM Geneva transfer price unaudited for 10 years (Congo pattern)IAS 24 / Transfer Pricing / Lei CFEM
V10Duarte family not identified as a stakeholder in SEMAD/IBAMA environmental licencesISO 14001 / ISO 45001
V13Glória Duarte — 81 years old, blind — without legal accessibility guaranteed by the StateCRPD / Brazilian Inclusion Act
V14Elderly Persons Statute not invoked to expedite proceedings of 4,049 days — Law 10.741/2003Lei 10.741/2003 Arts. 96–97
V15Duarte family property rights without effective State protection for 10 yearsDUDH Art. 17 / CF/88 Art. 5º
V16Zero remediation — the Brazilian State did not require humanitarian compensation in 11 years of extractionUNGPs 13/22 / CSDDD Art. 9
P7
Government of the People's Republic of China
National reputation — 孝 (Xiào) values betrayed · PBoC · CSRC · Ministry of Commerce · SASAC · Embassy in Brazil
6 violations
V1381-year-old woman without legal accessibility — China is a signatory to the CRPD; CMOC's conduct violates that commitmentCRPD
V14Abandonment of an extremely vulnerable elderly woman — direct contradiction of 孝 (Xiào — filial piety)UDHR / Confucian values 孝
V15Property rights denied for 10 years — China as a permanent member of the UN Security CouncilUDHR Art. 17 / Pact of San José
V16Zero documented remediation — Chinese-owned CMOC dishonours BRI Win-Win CooperationUNGPs 13/22 / CSDDD Art. 9
V19Community impacts omitted — the "responsible Chinese company" reputation compromised globallyGRI 413 / SASB M&M
V20CMOC greenwashing — UN SDG Seal + UN Global Compact coexist with 6 deaths and zero compensationUNGPs 15(c) / UN Global Compact
P8
Government of the United States
National security — contaminated critical minerals · Pentagon · State Dept · DoE · Treasury OFAC · USTR · USGS
6 violations
V3414 days without disclosure — a Chinese-controlled company managing a critical US defence mineral operating without transparencyHKEX Rule 13.09 / Dodd-Frank
V6CMOC→IXM Geneva transfer pricing — structure identical to the Congo US$800M settlement (Apr 2023)IAS 24 / OECD Transfer Pricing
V11No supply chain due diligence — Blood Niobium in defence contracts without verified originUNGPs / Uyghur Forced Labor Act (precedent)
V15Property rights denied — US Human Rights Reports require the State Dept to include the caseUDHR Art. 17 / Country Reports on HRs
V17All 5 LkSG/CSDDD triggers activated — risk of exclusion from EU public contracts affects American supply chainsLkSG / CSDDD / Executive Order 13817
V21RMI/MSCI certifications with incomplete data — the due diligence basis for Pentagon contractorsRMI / MSCI / FTSE / DoD Supply Chain Rules
P9
Press · NGOs · Civil Society
Public interest — documented human rights · Reuters · FT · Bloomberg · CPT · UN · Amnesty · HRW
6 violations
V3414 days of regulatory silence — no announcement to HKExNews following a landmark judicial rulingHKEX Rule 13.09
V13Glória Duarte, 81 years old, blind, without legal accessibility — alive and available for interview in Catalão/GOCRPD
V14Elderly Persons Statute violated — CMOC's lawyers claim "extreme comfort" in a public court filingLei 10.741/2003 Arts. 96–97
V15Property rights ignored for 10 years — 6 public death certificates, verifiable court recordsUDHR Art. 17 / Pact of San José
V16Zero remediation — 6 deaths, an 81-year-old widow, US$180/month vs. US$2.5M/day extracted from the landUNGPs 13/22 / CSDDD Art. 9
V20Greenwashing — UN SDG Seal and UN Global Compact coexist with documented, verifiable factsUNGPs 15(c) / CDC Art. 37
V Accounting / Regulatory
V Humanitarian / Legal
V ESG / Sustainability
ACCESS IS POWER USE IT BLOOD NIOBIUM · 2026
Glória Duarte is not in a position
to investigate the violations.
But you can — and that is why this guide exists.
Glória Duarte
Documented situation — Glória Duarte, 81 years old · Co-Owner of the Boa Vista Mine Lands · Niobium
She is 81 years old. She is blind. She lives on US$180 a month.
She is ill. She needs 2 surgeries. She cannot afford even antibiotics.
She has no lawyer capable of taking international action, travelling to China, or confronting a Chinese giant.
She does not speak English, Mandarin, German, or the language of IFRS standards.
She has no means of delivering a letter to the Chairman of CMOC Group Limited in Hong Kong.
She witnessed 6 deaths of co-owners during the 10 years of litigation. All were in conditions of extreme vulnerability.
The TJ-GO ruling (19 Mar 2025) that reversed the burden of proof in her favour has gone unanswered by CMOC for 407 days. No remediation measures have been taken.
Jesus Duarte — Glória's husband, who died humiliated in destitution — is what auditors call an Irreversible Remediation Failure. Glória Duarte may be next.

WHAT IF THIS WERE YOUR MOTHER?

如果是你的母亲呢? What if this were your mother?